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DETERMINATION OF DELINQUENCY IN THE
JUVENILE COURT: A SUGGESTED APPROACH*
JACK J. RAPPEPORTt
In the course of the statutory growth and development of a new
field of law-particularly a revolutionary one like that of juvenile
court law, beginning with the statute setting up the first juvenile
court in Cook County, Illinois-certain legal problems in the cate-
gories of constitutional protections, jurisdiction, proof, and disposi-
tion, have been disclosed.
Not only in its early years, but more recently, the juvenile court
movement has been subjected to criticism because some of its advo-
cates assert that the efficient administration of juvenile court hearings
demands both a denial of procedural safeguards, and a scrapping of
the customary rules of evidence. For, was not the original purpose of
the juvenile court laws to give minors additional protection, rather
than to take away the rights they already had?
If the federal and state constitutions guarantee a privilege against
self-incrimination, a right to employ counsel, to face one's accuser, to
summon witnesses, a trial by jury and an indictment in the case of
criminal offenses, upon what legal principle are these safeguards with-
held from juvenile offenders in a purely social trial? Is there really
a basic conflict between the social and the legal approaches to delin-
quency? Are the constitutional guarantees afforded to an accused to
be taken from the child if he is in court for protection and therapy,
rather than retributive punishment, merely because a legislature has
decided that crimes committed by juveniles are not criminal?
Should the causes for which children are brought before juvenile
courts be considered as separate and distinct, or should they, as the
* The helpful comments of Professors Sheldon Glueck and William Edward
McCurdy of the Harvard Law School in the preparation of this article are grate-
fully acknowledged.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Pittsburgh University School of Law.
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prevailing tendency seems to be, be lumped together? How specific
should the law be in defining the types of anti-social behavior which
constitute delinquency?
It is proposed in the following pages to confine the discussion to
problems of proof in the juvenile court, and to attempt to answer
some of these problems with greater precision than heretofore.
There are three separate categories of causes for which children are
brought before juvenile courts. They are: (1) dependency and neg-
lect, essentially involving parental fault, and an absence of fault on
the part of the child; (2) incorrigibility and waywardness, essentially
involving fault on the part of the child, who has as yet not done
anything socially objectionable, together with an absence of parental
fault; and (3) delinquency, involving the commission of an act which
would be considered a crime if committed by an adult. This third
category (delinquency) may result from either of the first two cate-
gories, or a combination of both of them, or neither.
The first two categories are properly determined under custody
principles, because they involve the care and control of the child. It
follows that in these two categories, the intervention of the court is
sought principally because of the situation in which the child finds
himself. This situation, .it is feared, could contain the seeds of future
anti-social behavior, although specific acts of the child may, but need
not, be involved. Here, both historically and analytically, the doctrine
of parens patriae could properly obtain. This doctrine would be ap-
plicable as an extension of custody principles, because the child's need
arises from the parents' failure to provide proper care. However, it is
anomalous to apply the notion of parens patriae to a specific anti-
social act, such as robbery, arson, rape and murder, which does not
necessarily result from parental neglect.'
Attempts to paternalize the trial of juveniles have at times been
misguided or confused by legislative and judicial lumping together of
vastly different concepts. 2 This manifests itself in a grouping to-
1. While acts comprising delinquency ordinarily are manifestations of parental
neglect, the atypical cases cited in the Glueek research indicate that this is not
necessarily the case. Glueck & Glueck, One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents
(1939). Cf. Glueck & Glueck, Unravelling Juvenile Delinquency (1950).
2. "Children charged with being delinquent are supposed to come before the
court because they have, in some -way, actively offended; children charged with
being neglected or dependent come before the court because their welfare is jeop-
ardized by improper surroundings." Flexner & Oppenheimer, Legal Aspect of the
Juvenile Court, 57 Am. L. Rev. 65, 79 (1923). See also In re Knowack, 158 N.Y.
482, 487, 53 N.E. 676, 677 (1899).
The tendency to abolish the legal distinction between delinquency and neglect
cases has in some states gone so far that the petition need only allege that the
child comes within the purview of the Juvenile Court Act. See, e.g., Va. Code §
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gether of criminal and noncriminal offenses under a single statutory
definition. The real problems of proof arise when it is attempted to
apply the same standards of procedure and evidence to both.
It is the prevailing tendency of juvenile courts to view their pro-
ceedings as more in the nature of a clinical process than a technical
trial. This has led to a preoccupation, not with whether the juvenile
should be treated at all, but rather with how the juvenile should be
treated.4 The desire to achieve informality in their proceedings has
impelled many juvenile courts to deny one or more of the procedural
safeguards constitutionally guaranteed in adult criminal trials. Yet,
to maintain the semblance of judicial proceedings, they have insisted
that findings be based on "competent evidence."5 However, the com-
petent evidence has not been precisely defined. As a matter of fact, in
practice the customary evidentiary rules are often greatly relaxed or
discarded.6 This may result in an unreliable determination of factual
questions upon which the right of the state to intervene is based.
Over-protectiveness at the fact-finding level has in many instances
resulted in a denial of procedural guarantees given adult defendants
either by constitutional provision or by statute.7 This has now be-
16.1-165(6) (Supp. 1956): ". . . statement of the facts which allegedly bring the
child within the purview of this law." Va. Code Ann. § 1907 (Michie 1942), which
was repealed by [1950] Acts 690, stated, "[I]t shall be sufficient for that purpose
[of the petition] to aver that the child mentioned therein is 'dependent,' 'neg-
lected,' or 'delinquent' as the case may be, and in need of the care and protection
of the State in that (here, stating concisely the facts which bring said child
within said terms as herein defined) .... " See also Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 105
(1941).
3. See Petition of Morin, 95 N.H. 518, 68 A.2d 668 (1949), where the statute
classified as a juvenile delinquent an infant below certain age who is "wayward,
disobedient, or uncontrolled by his parent" or who "deports himself as to injure
or endanger the health or morals of himself or others" or who "violates any law
of this state or any city or town ordinance."
4. See dissenting opinion of Musmanno, J., In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 610,
109 A.2d 523, 528 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
5. Id. at 606, 109 A.2d at 526.
6. Ibid., where hearsay testimony regarding a subsequently repudiated confes-
sion was admitted when both confessor and confession were readily available.
7. Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 Atl. 678 (1923) (right of accused to be
confronted by witnesses against him); Ex parte Januszewski, 196 Fed. 123 (S.D.
Ohio 1911); Wissenburg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205 (1930); Mar-
lowe v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 106, 133 S.W. 1137 (1911) (right to appeal);
In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 Pac. 467 (1924); Wissenburg v. Bradley, supra;
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl. 198 (1905) (trial by jury); Ex
parte Espinosa, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576 (1945) (right to bail); People v.
Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956); People v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d
741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955) (appointment of counsel); Rule v. Geddes, 23 App. D.C.
31 (1904) (notice of hearing); Commonwealth v. Fisher, supra; Mill v. Brown,
31 Utah 473, 88 Pac. 609 (1907) (arraignment, plea or warrant of arrest); Peo-
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come a matter of acute concern to the courts. The appearance and
meaning of a reformatory to a child may not correspond with the
judicial label of "protection." Most reform schools are no more than
junior prisons, with the same restraint of action as is found in a large
measure of adult penal institutions, both state and federal., More-
over, it is well known that when the child returns to society after a
period of "treatment" in a reformatory, his opportunities are defi-
ple v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953); In re Santillanes,
47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943) (protection against double jeopardy); In re
Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P.2d 282 (1947) ; In re Santillanes, supra; Peo-
ple v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932) (necessity to warn against self-
incrimination); Ex parte Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 41 S.W.2d 176 (1931) (con-
stitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment inapplicable); Ex
parte Nichols, 110 Cal. 651, 43 Pac. 9 (1896) (act not unconstitutional as pro-
viding unequal punishment for the same offense, where detention of minor guilty
of criminal offenses until majority might exceed the term of imprisonment for
an adult convicted of the same offense) ; cf. 62 Stat. 858 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 5034
(1952), note 30 infra. See also In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955); Mont Appeal, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460
(1954) (privilege against self-incrimination); Rose v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 316,
129 S.W.2d 639 (1939); State ex rel. Roberts v. Johnson, 196 Iowa 300, 194 N.W.
202 (1923) (necessity that information conform to the requirements of an indict-
ment); People v. Lewis, supra; People v. Pikunas, 260 N.Y. 72, 182 N.E. 675
(1932) (rules of criminal procedure do not apply).
8. MacCormick, The Essentials of a Training School Program, in Matching
Scientific Advance with Human Progress, National Council of Juvenile Court
Judges, Pittsburgh Conference 26-33 (1950): "There are things going on, meth-
ods of discipline used in the state training schools of this country, that would
cause the warden of Alcatraz to lose his job if he used them on his prisoners.
There are practices that are a daily occurrence in some of our state training
schools that are not permitted in the prisons or penitentiaries of the same states.
There are many states in which the discipline is more humane, more reasonable,
in the prison than it is in the state training school."
"In practice, these institutions range from a small number of schools in which
extraordinary insight into the problems of children is manifest both in program
and personnel, to some which can only be called junior prisons. Some still stress
repressive and disciplinary features to an extent that in correctional efforts puts
them behind the early children's refuges." Glueck, Crime and Justice 50 (1936).
[M]ost damaging is the very fact of institutional routine, which, though less
marked in industrial schools than in jails or prisons, is just as likely to result
in a mechanization not conducive to healthy self-management on release." Id. at 51.
Intensive follow-up investigation of the products of one of the oldest and best
reformatories revealed only 22% of 500 graduates did not continue in crime dur-
ing a five-year test period following their release on parole. Perhaps many so-
called reformatories do not materially reduce recidivism because in structure,
regime and personnel, they are little more than traditional prisons. Glueck &
Glueck, 500 Criminal Careers 314-15 (1920).
Cf. Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 39g, 424, 118 So. 184, 191 (1928) (dissenting
opinion); State v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406 (1885).
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nitely jeopardized0 Therefore, the unjust commitment of a child is
likely to create a resentment which might manifest itself in the future
in serious anti-social behavior.
Is there really a conflict between the clinical, or sociological, view-
point, which sees the anti-social act as symptomatic of deeper personal
disharmony, and the legalistic concept, which emphasizes proof of a
particular criminal act? To what extent, if any, is a subordination of
one concept to another, or adjustment between them, required? Actu-
ally, each has its particular function in all cases, regardless of the
age of the offender. The legal approach is applicable to problems of
proof. The sociological approach is applicable to problems of disposi-
tion, after the finding of guilt. Clinical studies, which do not readily
lend themselves to the type of definition and proof necessary in a legal
proceeding, may be used to implement individualized treatment, but
delinquency must be first established in a fair legal process. 10
9. In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 789, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952):
"While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a minor to be a
ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime, nevertheless,
for all practical purposes, this is a legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credu-
lity and doing violence to reason .... It is common knowledge that such an
adjudication when based upon a charge of committing an act that amounts to a
felony, is a blight upon the character of and is a serious impediment to the future
of such minor .... "
Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 341-42, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946): "The
judgment against a youth that he is delinquent is a serious reflection upon his
character and habits. The stain against him is not removed merely because the
statute says no judgment in this particular proceeding shall be deemed a con-
viction for crime or so considered. The stigma of conviction will reflect upon
him for life. It hurts his self-respect. It may, at some inopportune, unfortunate
moment, rear its ugly head to destroy his opportunity for advancement, and
blast his ambition to build up a character and reputation entitling him to the
esteem and respect of his fellowman."
Waite, How Far Can Court Procedure Be Socialized Without Impairing Indi-
vidual Rights?, 12 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 339, 344, (1921): "When we have mini-
mized the stigma of an adjudication of delinquency in every way that kindly in-
genuity may devise, it remains true that in the mind of the child, his family and
his acquaintances who know about it, it is practically equivalent to conviction of
a criminal offense. In the face of this fact legal theory should give way, and no
less evidence should be required than if the hearing were a criminal trial."
10. Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 611, 109 A.2d 523, 528 (1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 973 (1955) (dissenting opinion) : "There are two phases to every Ju-
venile Court proceeding: (1) Determination as to whether the juvenile involved
is delinquent or not; (2) Decision as.to whether the juvenile is to be returned to
his home, placed in a foster home, or committed to a reform institution. It is the
first phase with which we are most concerned in this appeal."
The majority in Holmes' Appeal upheld a juvenile judge's refusal to disclose
a probation officer's report, in reliance upon the United States Supreme Court
decision in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). However, the Williams
case distinguished between the fact-finding and dispositional phases of every
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The object of this article is to show that there is no inherent in-
consistency between the juvenile court philosophy of correction in
lieu of punishment on the one hand, and on the other, the equally
sound proposition that when a child commits what would constitute
a crime if the same act were committed by an adult, fair play requires
that the child be afforded equal procedural safeguards.
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE JUVENILE COURT MOVEMENT
Discrimination between the treatment of adult criminals and young
offenders capable of reformation is nothing new. As far back as the
tenth century, Athelstane promulgated certain laws concerning the
probation of young offenders, and the abolition of the death penalty
for children."' However, it is somewhat discouraging to note that for
many centuries thereafter, the history of the criminal law of England
is one of steady retrogression. In the time of the Plantagenets, judges
would stay sentence upon youthful offenders so that royal clemency,
which was available in most cases, might be invoked. However, the
humanity of the early middle ages declined so that by the time of the
seventeenth century, an eight-year-old boy was hanged for arson, and
in 1833, the death sentence was pronounced upon a child who broke
a pane of glass and stole two pennyworth of paint.12 Examples are
not wanting of children in the United States receiving the same kind
of treatment.1 3
criminal case. The Court pointed out that while constitutional guarantees and
strict rules of proof were relevant on the narrow issue of guilt, the sentencing
judge is not so narrowly confined in determining the type and extent of punish-
ment after an adjudication of status, because possession of the fullest information
possible concerning the defendant is highly relevant to appropriate sentencing.
11. Athelstane (924-939 A.D.) initiated two main changes in the law: (1) any
thief over the age of twelve was criminally liable for his actions, and should not
be pardoned; (2) no youth under sixteen years of age would suffer capital punish-
ment. See Garnett, Children and the Law 146 (1911); cf. Wilkins, Leges Anglo-
Saxonical ecclesiastical et civiles 70 (1721).
Garnett points out that Athelstane "not only attempted this reformation of
juvenile offenders, but enacted in the Tenth Century substantial portions of the
Children's Act, the probation of young offenders, the requirement of security from
parents, the abolition of the death penalty, even to the very age specified in the
Children's Act."
12. Blackstone, Commentaries *23-24 (1770); Garnett, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 137; Waddy, The Police Court and Its Work 104-07 (1925). See State v.
Adams, 76 Mo. 355 (1882).
13. State v. Fischer, 245 Iowa 170, 60 N.W.2d 105 (1953); Thomas v. Common-
wealth, 300 Ky. 480, 189 S.W.2d 686 (1945); State v. Guin, 212 La. 475, 32 So.2d
895 (1947) ; Lou, Juvenile Courts in the United States 14 n.3 (1927) (thirteen-
year-old hanged in New Jersey in 1828 for an offense committed when he was
twelve).
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At common law, the age of twenty-one had no significance at all
with respect to age distinctions and criminal responsibility. Since
criminal law is based on culpability, it would seem that there must
be some age below which a person is incapable of having specific in-
tent deserving of punishment. Infants were therefore divided into
three classes for the purpose of establishing criminal responsibility,
namely: absolute immunity, full liability, and conditional liability.
There were those under seven years of age who were conclusively
presumed to be incapable of committing a criminal offense. This "pre-
sumption" was really a rule of law that such child could not be con-
victed. Over fourteen, a minor was presumed to have an adult's
mentality, and was placed in the same category. Criminal acts com-
mitted by children within the age group of seven to fourteen were
presumed not to have been done with a criminal intention. This pre-
sumption, however, was rebutted by showing that a particular child
was sufficiently vicious to have the necessary mens rea; a child proved
to be capable of malice would be punished therefor. Such rebuttal
would depend on the mentality of the child in each specific case. If a
child were shown to have sufficient mentality for criminal intent, he
could be found guilty of a crime.'4 As a result, we find some extreme
cases at common law of eleven-year-olds being hanged for relatively
minor offenses. Public opinion, which might not be reflected by the
jury in a specific case, looked askance at the infliction of capital
punishment on children.
Moreover, children of very tender years were incarcerated in adult
criminal prisons.15 This led to a persuasive argument for affording a
different sort of treatment to juvenile offenders. Since there are
separate jails for men and women, it was argued, separate jails should
be maintained for juvenile offenders.r It was further contended that
14. By 1302 the English common law had adopted the Roman law concept of
absolute immunity for children under the age of seven. Y. B. Rolls. 30 Edw. 1,
510 (1302), 24 Seld. Soc. 109 (1909); see Angelo v. People, 96 Ill. 209 (1880);
State v. Aaron, 4 N.J.L. *232, 238-39 (1818) (absolute immunity); Heilman v.
Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 57, 1 S.W. 731 (1886) (conditional liability); Gilchrist
v. State, 100 Ark. 330, 140 S.W. 260 (1911) (full liability). See also Ludwig,
Youth and the Law 12-36 (1955); note 25 infra.
15. "Children under ten years of age were arrested, held in police stations,
and tried in the police courts. If convicted, they were usually fined and, if the
fine was not paid, sent to the City Prison." Lathrop, The Background of the Ju-
venile Court in Illinois, in The Child, The Clinic, and The Court 291 (1925).
16. The first implementation of this idea was the establishment of the House
of Refuge in New York in 1825, which was the first reformatory for juvenile
offenders in the United States. Later Pennsylvania in 1828 followed suit. Other
states established similar institutions. For a penetrating contemporary account
of such institutions and the motives leading to their establishment, see de Beau-
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a failure so to provide would result in the juvenile offender coming
out worse than when he went in. These arguments are understand-
able and are today generally recognized.
As a matter of fact, beginning with the early nineteenth century,
statutes were passed directed toward improvement of the treatment
of juvenile offenders.17 Toward the close of that century, a general
movement was under way to humanize justice, culminating in the
creation of the juvenile court. The law establishing the first juvenile
court in the United States officially recognized that the issues pre-
sented in juvenile court require understanding, guidance and protec-
tion, rather than the stricter technical concepts of "criminal respon-
sibility" and "punishment.''1s
However, much of the subsequent development of the juvenile
courts, instead of concentrating on the post-trial disposition, centered
upon the treatment of juvenile offenders in the pre-conviction stage.
The thought was, and to a great extent still is, that they ought not
to be tried before tough jurymen in the regular courtroom, where
criminals are being led back and forth. It was also argued that chil-
dren ought not to be subjected to the traumatic experience of a
criminal trial, because shocking them would make the rehabilitation
process more difficult. What was needed, it was urged, was a relaxa-
tion of the stricter technical criminal procedures in favor of a more
homelike atmosphere, to acquire supervisory rather than penal control
over the child, and institute corrective measures as early in the for-
mative stages of his development as possible.
As a matter of history, where the welfare or the property of the
child was threatened as a result of parental deficiency, the state in-
tervened to supply the necessary parental care and control.10 How-
mont and de Tocqueville, Du Syst~me Penitentiare aux Etats Unis, passim
(1833). This has been translated into English and German.
17. Mass. Laws 1877, c. 210, § 5; Mass. Laws 1872, c. 358; Mass. Laws 1869,
c. 453, § 7; Mo. Laws 1897, p. 71; Mo. Laws 1825, p. 784; N.Y. Laws 1892, c. 217,
§ 7; R.I. Acts and Resolves 1898, c. 581, §§ 2, 3, 5, 7.
18. The first tribunal created to deal specifically with the problems of juvenile
delinquency was the Juvenile Court of Cook County, Illinois, established in 1899.
Ill. Laws 1899, p. 131. Section 2 provided: "In all trials under this Act, any
person interested therein may demand a jury of six, or the judge of his own
motion may order a jury of the same number to try the case." Perhaps this
vestige of traditional criminal procedure was included to meet possible constitu-
tional objections.
19. See McCurdy, Persons and Domestic Relations 791-807 (4th ed. 1952); Ex
parte Badger, 386 Mo. 139, 226 S.W. 936 (1920) (parental rights, particularly
those of the father, loomed large at common law).
Nevertheless, some examples exist of courts of chancery taking over the care
of children, where the parents were deemed unfit by virtue of their conduct. See
Wellesley v. Wellesley, 2 Bligh N.S. 124, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078 (Ch. 1828), where the
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ever, English courts of equity never presumed to exercise jurisdic-
tion where the only basis was violation of the criminal law.20 It fol-
lows, therefore, that historically and analytically parens patriae ex-
tends to dependent and neglected, but not to delinquent, children.
Yet, there is frequent reliance on the equity origins of the juvenile
court.;- The intervention of the state as pater patriae in the juvenile
crime situation is founded on a judicial presumption of parental de-
ficiency. Such a presumption, which arises automatically upon the
child's commission of an act of delinquency, denies the possibility that
a child may enjoy the best parental care and still, on some particular
occasion, commit an act to which politically organized society objects.
That this presumption is unwarranted has been recognized by some
courts, which distinguish between parental neglect cases, where notice
to parents is required, and cases where children are accused of de-
linquency, where such notice is not required.
22
father was deprived of the custody of his children because of his immoral conduct.
See also Shelley v. Westbrooke, Jacob 266, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1821), wherein
Shelley, the poet, was denied the right to provide for the education of his children
because of his atheistic views.
20. See Lou, Juvenile Courts in the United States 7 (1927): "The view that
chancery jurisdiction is not a factor in creating the juvenile court is correct as
to the delinquency jurisdiction."
In Pound, Interpretation of Legal History 134-35 (1923), it is said: "Judicial
empiricism has done for the common law most of what was done for the Roman
law by juristic science. Usually it proceeds cautiously from case to case with an
occasional creative generalization. But there are many cases of creative judicial
action which have made new chapters in the law or new legal institutions almost
at a stroke .... American law may furnish an example in the institution known
as the Juvenile Court. This institution, which is making its way everywhere, is
due to the initiative of a few definitely known socially-minded judges, who had
the large vision to see what was required and the good sense not to be hindered
in doing it because there had never been such things before. Today we find a
legal basis for it in the jurisdiction of chancery over infants. We reconcile it
with legal-historical dogmas on this basis. But the jurisdiction of equity over in-
fants was not a factor in creating it. It arose on the criminal side of the courts
because of the revolt of those judges' conscience from legal rules that required
trial of children over seven as criminals and sentences of children over fourteen
to penalties provided for adult offenders." See also Lindsey, The Juvenile Court
from a Lawyer's Standpoint, 52 Annals 143 (1914); Mack, The Juvenile Court,
23 Harv. L. Rev. 104 (1909).
21. See note 7 supra; McCurdy, Persons and Domestic Relations 807-10 (4th
ed. 1952).
22. Statutes now require notice in most jurisdictions. However, the distinction
was made in cases where the statute was silent with reference to notice or ser-
vice of summons.
Sinquefield v. Valentine, 159 Miss. 144, 132 So. 81 (1931), and cases therein
cited, held that notice was required in neglect cases by the due process clause of
the state constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution.
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The distinction between parental neglect and specific unlawful con-
duct which interferes with the rights of others is one which requires
the application of different policies and principles. One of the impor-
tant differences is the role of the juvenile court judge in each case.
In a case where a parent or guardian is felt to be deficient, or acting
contrary to the child's best interests, the court's unique function is
to shield the child. 23 However, this is not so when the court is dealing
with a juvenile accused of specific unlawful conduct. In this case, the
court no longer acts as a buffer between the minor and persons with
adverse interests.24
Criminal law concepts have also participated in the development
and rationalization of juvenile court practices. The common law
presumption of absolute immunity below the age of seven was based
upon the absence of criminal intent. The non-criminal procedures
followed in the juvenile court are sometimes explained as grounded
upon an extension of the common law age of inability to possess mens
rea to all persons who qualify as juveniles under the age limits spec-
ified in the statutes. Such rationale seems to be unrealistic, particu-
larly when dealing with infants nearing maturity. Moreover, the
analogy fails entirely when it is realized that at common law no action
whatever was taken against offenders under seven years of age ;21
Cf. Comment, 3 Miss. L.J. 342 (1930-31); Comment, 5 So. Cal. L. Rev. 161 (1931-
32).
In Ex parte Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 41 S.W.2d 176 (1931), the distinction is
taken between neglected children and delinquent children, notice to parent not
being necessary in the case of delinquent children. Cf. Estate of Hampton, 55 Cal.
App. 2d 543, 131 P.2d 565 (1942), where an award of custody of a child to an
institution for the ultimate purpose of adoption, made without notice to parent
under Kansas statute not requiring notice, was held void as a denial of due
process. But see In re Roth, 158 Neb. 789, 64 N.W.2d 799 (1954) (notice neces-
sary under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-206 (1943)).
23. See Wellesley v. Wellesley, 2 tligh N.S. 124, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078 (Ch. 1828).
24. "The reason for a different prdcedure in neglect cases and delinquency
cases is obvious. In a neglect case, only the proper custody and support of the
child are involved; but in a delinquency case, the reformation of the child is also
involved, and the proceeding is between the state and the child." Ex parte
Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 724, 41 S.W.2d 176, 177 (1931). (Emphasis added.)
25. The common law ignored offenders below the upper age limit of absolute
irresponsibility. In the Eyre of Kent case, 24 Seld. Soc. 109 (1909), it was said
that "an infant under the age of seven years, though he be convicted of felony,
shall go free of judgment because he knoweth not of good and evil." As early as
1302, Spigurnal, J., stated that a child indicted for homicide committed before he
was seven should not suffer judgment (Y. B. Rolls, 30 Edw. 1, 510 (1302)) illus-
trating that what is commonly referred to as a conclusive presumption is really
a positive rule of law that an infant under seven cannot be convicted. Cf. State
v. Peterson, 153 Minn. 310, 190 N.W. 345 (1922) ; People v. Wunsch, 198 Ill. App.
437 (1916).
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whereas under the juvenile court laws, it can be argued that the sole
purpose of the rationalized extension of the age of immunity is to
subject the child to "treatment." Thus, the net effect of applying
treatment in all cases is to eliminate the area of absolute immunity,
as it existed at common law.
In emphasizing the fact that the proceedings of the juvenile court
were not criminal in nature, it was said by an early advocate of this
system,
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy
or girl committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how has he
become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and
in the interest of the State to save him from a downward career.26
It is felt that the author of this statement never intended the parens
patriae power over dependent and neglected children to extend to
cases where there was merely a difference of opinion about the best
course to pursue in rearing the child.27 Nor in delinquency cases,
where issues of fact are involved, was it intended to impose control
over those who have committed no offense. Nevertheless, an unwar-
ranted extension of the implications of this statement, as interpreted
by many of the courts, has resulted in a denial of constitutional and
procedural safeguards, and the abandonment of many of the usual
rules of evidence.- Other courts have asserted that no less evidence
should be required in a juvenile proceeding than if the hearing were
a criminal trial.2 1
26. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104 (1909).
27. In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952). "The court
cannot regulate by its processes the internal affairs of the home. Dispute be-
tween parents when it does not involve anything immoral or harmful to the wel-
fare of the child is beyond the reach of the law. The vast majority of matters
concerning the upbringing of children must be left to the conscience, patience and
self-restraint of father and mother. No end of difficulties would arise should
judges try to tell parents how to bring up their children." People ex rel. Sisson
v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 287, 2 N.E.2d 660, 661 (1936).
The juvenile court law certainly does not contemplate the taking of children
from their parents and breaking up family ties merely because, in the estimation
of probation officers and courts, the children can be better provided for and more
wisely trained as wards of the state." People v. Gutierrez, 47 Cal. App. 128, 130,
190 Pac. 200, 202 (1920). See also Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N.E.
892 (1913) ; In re Rinker, 180 Pa. Super. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1956).
28. Mont Appeal, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954) ; Campbell v. Siegler,
10 N.J. Misc. 987, 162 Atl. 154 (1932) ; In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523
(1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
29. In re Lewis, 11 N.J. 217, 94 A.2d 328 (1953); In re Sippy, Mun. Ct. App.
D.C., 97 A.2d 455 (1953); In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631
(1952); In re Green, 123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1952); In re Madik, 233
App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y.S. 765 (1931).
"Our activities in behalf of the child may have been awakened, but the funda-
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The federal and state statutes30 creating the juvenile courts in some
measure deny certain state or federal constitutional safeguards guar-
anteed to a defendant in criminal proceedings. This position is
justified by declarations that the proceedings are equitable, looking
to the rehabilitation of the child, rather than criminal 1 They provide
in most instances for treatment in a reformatory or school rather
than imprisonment.32 And the civil disabilities which attach to adult
criminals are inapplicable to juvenile offenders.
The more advanced type of juvenile court statute provides that
neither the fact that the child has been before the court for hearing,
nor any evidence given in the hearing, nor the record of conviction
or disposition, shall be admissible against the child in any other pro-
ceeding for any purpose whatever, except in subsequent proceedings
in the same court against the same juvenile under the act.3 3 Never-
mental ideas of criminal procedure have not changed. These require a definite
charge, a hearing, competent proof, and a judgment. Anything less is arbitrary
power." People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 316, 155 N.E. 584, 588 (1927).
30. "A juvenile alleged to have committed one or more acts in violation of the
law of the United States not punishable by death or life imprisonment, and not
surrendered to the authorities of a state, shall be proceeded against as a juvenile
delinquent if he consents to such procedure, unless the Attorney-General, in his
discretion, has expressly directed otherwise. In such event, the juvenile shall be
proceeded against by information and no criminal presentation shall be instituted
for the alleged violation." 62 Stat. 857, 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (Supp. 1954). See also
62 Stat. 857, 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1952): "Such consent shall be deemed a waiver
of a trial by jury." Cf. 62 Stat. 858, 18 U.S.C. § 5034 (1952): "No juvenile can
be confined for a period greater than would be possible for an adult convicted of
the same offense."; Ga. Code § 24-2419 (1951).
31. See note 7 supra.
32. "Unless the institution is one whose primary concern is the individual's
moral and physical well-being, unless its facilities are intended for and adapted
to guidance, care, education and training, rather than punishment, unless its
supervision is that of a guardian, not that of a prison guard or jailer, it seems
clear a commitment to such an institution is by reason of conviction of crime, and
cannot withstand an assault for violation of fundamental Constitutional safe-
guards." White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1944).
33. "No adjudication under the provisions of this chapter shall operate as a
disqualification of any child subsequently to hold office, or as a forfeiture of any
right or privilege to receive any license, granted by public authority. No child
shall be denominated a criminal by reason of such adjudication, nor shall such
adjudication be denominated a conviction .... Neither the fact that a child has
been before the Children's Court for hearing, nor any confession for hearing,
admission or statement made by him to the court or to any officer thereof while
he is under the age of sixteen years, if the court be a Domestic Relations Court
or eighteen years, if the court be a Juvenile Domestic Relations Court, shall ever
be admissible as evidence against him or his interest in any other court." S. C.
Code § 15-1202 (1952). See also New York Children's Court Act § 45, which is
practically identical.
But see In re Sengillo's Estate, 206 Misc. 751, 134 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1954) where
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theless, school and military authorities are frequently given access to
the record, and it has been held that a present defendant formerly
involved in juvenile court proceedings may be questioned about the
nature of the accusation, but not about the outcome.34 Probation of-
ficers' reports as well as other records can be examined to determine
present guilt.3 The hearsay reports of social workers and officers of
a fifteen-year-old boy shot his father and was indicted by the grand jury on a
charge of murder in the first degree. The indictment was dismissed after the
criminal court directed that action be removed to children's court. The boy was
subsequently adjudicated a juvenile delinquent. Later, the children's court held
that the equitable maxim that no man shall be permitted to profit by his own
wrong would bar the juvenile from taking a distributive share in his father's
estate.
Moreover, when a juvenile court decision is appealed, the record is not only
printed in the briefs, but later becomes a part of the appellate court decision.
In view of this, it is submitted the frequent statement by these same appellate
courts that the proceedings of the juvenile court are not a matter of public
record becomes anomalous. See Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269
(1944) (provisions do not afford sufficient immunity to avoid the constitutional
prohibitions).
34. The Michigan statute, unlike the South Carolina statute (see note 33
supra), did not contain the phase "neither the fact that the child had been before
the Children's Court . . . shall be admissible as evidence" but declared that "a
disposition of any child under this chapter, or any evidence given in such case,
shall not in any civil, criminal or any other cause or proceeding whatever in any
court, be lawful or proper evidence against such child for any purpose whatever,
except in subsequent cases against the same child under this chapter. . . ." Mich.
Stat. Ann. § 27.3178 (584) (1943).
The court conceded that the juvenile court records were inadmissible and that
the statutory aim was "to hide youthful errors from the full gaze of the public
and bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past"; nevertheless, a question
to a fifteen-year-old prosecutrix in a rape prosecution whether or not she had
been in trouble with juvenile authorities before was admissible, since it did not
refer to disposition of child or any evidence given in any juvenile case and was
competent on question of credibility. People v. Smallwood, 306 Mich. 49, 10
N.W.2d 303 (1943). To the same effect is State v. Guerrero, 58 Ariz. 421, 429,
120 P.2d 798, 802 (1942), interpreting Ariz. Code § 46-106 (1939).
The real reason for the decision in the Smallwood case was not the difference
in the statutory language noted, but the desirability of inquiring into the un-
chaste tendencies of a young complainant in a rape case, which may affect her
credibility. The court cited 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 196 (3d ed. 1940) which
criticizes statutes that forbid subsequent use of the juvenile court proceedings
in this type of case. Wigmore also favors using juvenile court records in sen-
tencing of prisoners under "habitual offenders" statutes. See Mass. Ann. Laws
§ 119:60 (1957), precluding use of juvenile proceedings "except in subsequent
proceedings for waywardness or delinquency against the same child, and except
in imposing sentence in any criminal proceeding against the same person." (Em-
phasis added.)
35. The social workers' reports, like those of probation officers, are not neces-
sarily objective, being a reflection of the background of the officer making them.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the court can be used, and most often without subjecting the reporter
to examination under oath.36 It should be noted that even when they
are so subjected, the evidence is still hearsay. 3' Publicity is deemed
injurious, and hearings may be closed, and the publication of the
child's name without written permission of the court may be pro-
hibited.38 The infant may, even against his will, be subjected to
physical and mental examination, and may be compelled to answer
questions concerning his past and present crimes.30 The court may
commit the juvenile to long imprisonment for relatively minor
things.40 In the most extreme type of statute, the juvenile court may
hear the evidence in the absence of the child. 41
In addition, it must be borne in mind that because of the heavy workload, social
investigations often tend to be superficial.
Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-26 (1953), provides that the "court ... shall inquire
into the home environment, history, associations, and general condition of such
children, may order physical and mental examinations to be made by competent
physicians, psychologists and psychiatrists, and may receive in evidence the veri-
fied reports of probation officers, physicians, psychologists or psychiatrists con-
cerning such matters."
36. See, however, S.C. Code § 15-1137 (1953): "The probation officer, unless
the court otherwise directs, shall make a prompt and thorough investigation be-
fore, during or after hearing concerning the history, character and circumstances
of any case assigned to him. His reports shall be submitted to the court, and
they shall include such facts as may aid the court in correcting conditions re-
sponsible for the appearance of the case in court and in planning for the future
welfare of the parties involved." See also § 15-1134, providing that "The judge
may take testimony under oath with regard to any matter concerning the court."
It would thus appear that the parties are no longer entitled as a matter of right
to examine the probation officer.
La. Acts § 13 (1924), empowered the judge to admit "any other character of
evidence which the court in its discretion may deem proper," including testimony
of the probation officers. See State in the Interest of McDonald, 207 La. 117, 20
So. 2d 556 (1944).
Recently trial courts have been reversed on appeal when probation officers'
reports have been the sole evidentiary basis of an adjudication of delinquency.
Ford v. State, 122 Ind. App. 315, 104 N.E.2d 406 (1952) ; In re Mantell, 157 Neb.
900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954).
37. S.C. Code § 256-159 (Supp. 1944) states: "Hearings shall be conducted
in accordance with such rules as the Court may adopt, and the Court may con-
sider and receive as evidence the result of any investigation had or made by the
probation officer; provided, that either party shall be entitled to examine the
probation officer under oath thereon."
38. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 45-205 (1947).
39. "... . and may compel children to testify concerning the facts alleged in
the petition." Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-26 (1953).
40. Ex parte Nichols, 110 Cal. 651, 43 Pac. 9 (1896). Compare 18 U.S.C.
§ 5034, supra note 30.
41. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-26 (1953): "The court may hear evidence in the
absence of such children." On the necessity for the presence of the delinquent,
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Where the statute provides either for the optional 2 or mandatory
prosecution of the juvenile in criminal court for certain offenses, 3
it necessarily follows that the child is entitled to constitutional guar-
antees, when regular criminal procedures are invoked.44 However, in
all other cases, a clear distinction must be made between two types of
constitutional challenges to the validity of the juvenile court statutes.
On the one hand, there is the outright denial of constitutional safe-
guards protecting human liberties ;45 on the other, there are the fre-
quent attempts to alter, through legislative action, the jurisdiction of
constitutionally created courts. Additional jurisdiction may be con-
ferred upon a constitutional court,46 which may or may not affect
civil liberties, or jurisdiction over juveniles may be transferred from
a constitutional court where civil liberties are guaranteed to a legisla-
tive or constitutional court where they are not. This latter procedure
involves the same infringement of constitutional guarantees as does
an outright denial47
the Utah court had said that while this section gives the court power to hear
evidence in the absence of the delinquent, and, no doubt, in many instances
it may be necessary to do so, yet it is better, at least in case of children
over ten years of age, to permit them to be present and to be heard in their own
defense respecting their custody, conduct and control. Stoker v. Gowans, 45 Utah
556, 563, 147 Pac. 911, 913 (1915). Cf. Weiss v. Ussery, 92 So. 2d 916 (Ala.
1957) (holding no authority to adjudicate delinquency when accused not present
at hearing).
42. Mosely v. State, 1 Ala. App. 108, 56 So. 35 (1911); Hicks v. State, 146 Ga.
706, 92 S.E. 216 (1917) ; Childress v. State, 133 Tenn. 121, 179 S.W. 643 (1915).
43. In re Sanders, 53 Kan. 191, 36 Pac. 348 (1894); Ex parte Parsons, 232
S.W. 740 (Mo. 1921); Ex parte Cain, 86 Tex. Crim. 509, 217 S.W. 386 (1920).
44. Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315, 115 N.W. 682 (1908);
State v. Tincher, 258 Mo. 1, 166 S.W. 1028 (1914).
45. Tappan points out that protection of child from the unlawful acts of gov-
ernment officials is an essential duty of the courts under the parens patriae doc-
trine. "The presumption is commonly adopted that since the state has determined
to protect and save its wards, it will not do injury to them through its diverse
officials, so that these children need no due process protections against injury.
Several exposures to court; a jail remand of days, weeks or even months; a long
period in a correctional school with young thieves, muggers and murderers-these
can do no conceivable harm if the state's purpose be beneficent and the pro-
cedures be 'chancery'! Children are adjudicated in this way every day without
visible manifestations of due process. They are incarcerated. They become adult
criminals, too, in thankless disregard of the state's good intentions as 'parens
patriae.'" Tappan, Juvenile Delinquency 205 (1949).
46. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl. 198 (1905). In this case, the
Pennsylvania statute purported to confer jurisdiction on the constitutional court
to sit as a juvenile court. One question involved was whether it was within the
power of the Pennsylvania legislature to confer jurisdiction upon a constitutional
court.
47. In re Mei, 122 N.J. Eq. 125, 192 Atl. 80 (1937) (illustrating an attempt to
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The constitutionality of a deprivation of civil liberties may be justi-
fied in two ways. In all instances where the juvenile court jurisdic-
tion is concurrent 48 or qualified, 49 and in some where it is exclusive, 0
the statutes are not considered as changing the substantive nature of
the offense committed, but merely changing the procedures for trying
infants accused of committing these crimes. The theory is that, not-
withstanding the fact that the offense is still a crime, the defendants
are susceptible to reformation because they are mentally and emotion-
ally immature. Therefore, different procedures aimed toward antic-
ipatory preventive treatment, rather than punishment, should be
employed. Under this construction, when a juvenile offender is not
apprehended or tried until he is beyond the age of juvenile court
jurisdiction, criminal courts are held to be competent. In many in-
stances where the juvenile court is given original and exclusive ju-
risdiction over juvenile offenses,51 however, the statute purports to
effect a substantive change in the xature of the offense itself. Al-
transfer jurisdiction from a constitutional court to a legislative court, which was
held inapplicable to murder and other heinous crimes).
W. Va. Const. art. VIII, § 12 provides that the circuit courts "shall, except in
cases confined exclusively by this constitution to some other tribunal, have origi-
nal and general jurisdiction... [over] all crimes and misdemeanors." There is
thus raised the same constitutional question presented in the Mei case, supra, and
the Fisher case, supra note 46.
W. Va. Sess. Laws 1936, c. 105, as amended, W. Va. Code Ann. § 4904(50)
(1955), relating to criminal jurisdiction of the juvenile courts, provides: "[E]x-
cept as to a violation of law which if committed by an adult would be a capital
offense, the juvenile court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine
criminal charges ... against a person who is under eighteen years of age at the
time of the alleged offense." However, the Attorney-General of West Virginia
has recently taken the position that the child welfare provisions of this statute do
not preclude criminal prosecution of juveniles in the circuit courts or other courts
having criminal jurisdiction. Thus construed, the statute does not interfere with
the constitutional jurisdiction of the circuit courts. Op. Att'y-Gen. W. Va., Feb.
22, 1957.
48. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 7185-15 to -16 (1953) ; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 93-603,
93-613, 93-614, 93-618 (1940).
49. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 102, 107 (1952) (providing for investigation
by juvenile court judge of facts in case where child under sixteen is charged with
crime, and remission to common law criminal court if judge finds child knew of
the wrongfulness of the act).
50. Davis v. State, 21 Ala. App. 649, 111 So. 645 (1927); Lane v. State, 20
Ala. App. 192, 101 So. 521 (1924); State v. Adams, 316 Mo. 157, 289 S.W. 948
(1926); Strachner v. State, 86 Temx. Crim. 89, 215 S.W. 305 (1919); McClaren
v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 31, 209 S.W. 669 (1919).
51. State v. Dubray, 121 Kan. 886, 250 Pac. 316 (1926); White v. Common-
wealth, 242 Ky. 736, 47 S.W.2d 548 (1932) ; Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky.
222, 188 S.W. 370 (1916); State v. Malone, 156 La. 617, 100 So. 788 (1924);
State v. Coble, 181 N.C. 554, 107 S.E. 132 (1921); Johnson v. State, 31 N.J.
Super. 382, 106 A.2d 560, aff'd, 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955).
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though the anti-social act would normally be denominated a crime,
when the offender is within the juvenile age group it is no longer a
criminal act but something called juvenile delinquency. Under the
substantive construction, the criminal court never acquires jurisdic-
tion, even though the defendant is no longer an infant when he is
arrested.
The juvenile court statutes are generally silent on whether the
jurisdiction of the court vests at the time the act is committed or at
the time proceedings are instituted. Those jurisdictions which regard
their statute as procedural would take the date when the proceeding
is instituted as the basis for the juvenile court's jurisdiction. 52 On the
other hand, jurisdictions regarding their statute as changing the sub-
stantive nature of the offense would have jurisdiction vest on the date
of the alleged commission of the act of delinquency.53
Whether the juvenile statutes are regarded as procedural or sub-
stantive in nature, certain anomalies may arise when an accused is
apprehended while still within the statutory age limits for juveniles,
but is not finally tried until after reaching the upper juvenile age
limit. In the first set of circumstances, the accused, while still a ju-
venile within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court, might
have been erroneously tried for a felony in the regular criminal court.
That court's judgment rendered without jurisdiction is wholly void,
and subject to reversal and remand by the appellate court. At the
time of the remand, the accused is above the upper statutory age limit
for juveniles.54 The second situation involves a delay in bringing the
offender before the court for some reason, so that the hearing takes
place after the upper age limit is reached.55 In the third situation,
although the offender is tried in the juvenile court, the decision on
appeal is remanded for further proceedings after the offender is past
the age limit2G
If the statute is regarded as merely procedural, the case could nor-
mally be heard in the criminal court. However, the court in the third
situation may be required to release the offender under certain cir-
cumstances. This would occur if the particular jurisdiction is one that
52. Davis v. State, 21 Ala. App. 649, 111 So. 645 (1927); Burrows v. State,
38 Ariz. 99, 297 Pac. 1029 (1931); People v. Ross, 235 Mich. 433, 209 N.W. 663
(1926); Scopillitti v. State, 41 Ohio App. 221, 180 N.E. 740 (1932); Ex parte
Albiniano, 62 R.I. 429, 6 A.2d 554 (1939); Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179
S.W.2d 269 (1944); State v. Melvin, 144 Wash. 687, 258 Pac. 859 (1927).
53. See note 51 supra.
54. This situation was presented in McClaren v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 31, 209
S.W. 669 (1919).
55. Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 222, 188 S.W. 370 (1916).
56. This possibility discussed in Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d
269 (1944).
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abridges or completely denies the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination, basing the denial on the fact that testimony taken
in the juvenile court cannot be used elsewhere 7 The resulting anom-
aly is that though the offense is so serious that it would be punishable
by death or life imprisonment had it been committed by an adult, not
only does the juvenile offender go unpunished, but he is not even sub-
ject to state control under a clinical approach. 8
Where the juvenile statute is considered to be substantive, and the
court's jurisdiction is continuing as to persons who no longer qualify
as juveniles at the time of the hearing, the problem presented by the
offender's remand to the- juvenile court shortly after reaching adult-
hood is normally of little moment. In the first and second cases, the
offender would be a statutory adult at the time of his first hearing
before the juvenile court, as opposed to the third case where the court
has affirmatively taken jurisdiction while the offender is still a ju-
venile. However, the courts in the substantive states make no distinc-
tion between "competence" and "jurisdiction," but hold that jurisdic-
tion vests exclusively in the juvenile court upon commission of the
offense. 9 Jurisdiction once having attached under the express pro-
visions of many statutes, it may continue during the minority of the
defendant. 6° Under these circumstances, the offender is still presum-
57. This anomaly was recognized in Dendy v. Wilson, supra note 56, which
held that the rule declaring that evidence given in the juvenile court shall be
inadmissible in another proceeding was not sufficient immunity upon which to
deny the privilege against self-incrimination, unless the court under these cir-
cumstances was prepared to release the offender.
58. In M Claren v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 31, 209 S.W. 669 (1919) the court
said, "[lIt could hardly be seriously contended that one who had committed a
heinous crime, as, for instance, murder, while 15 or 16 years of age, and who
was not apprehended or indicted until past 21, would, by reason of such lapse, go
absolutely unwhipped of justice, unless the language of the law were such that
it was reasonably susceptible of no other construction than one which produced
such results."
59. In Johnson v. State, 31 N.J. Super. 382, 106 A.2d 560, aff'd, 18 N.J. 422,
114 A.2d 1 (1955), contrary to the usual rule that-with the exception of con-
tempt in facie curiae-jurisdiction is acquired by the filing of a pleading, the
court held that not only are persons below a certain age subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, but by the doing of the prescribed act, the ju-
venile court acquires jurisdiction. Cf. State v. Coble, 181 N.C. 554, 107 S.E. 132
(1921).
But see Ford v. State, 122 Ind. App. 315, 104 N.E.2d 406 (1952) to the effect
that a juvenile court cannot acquire jurisdiction of an action to have a child made
a ward of the court unless a summons is issued. See also State v. Ferrell, 140
W. Va. 202, 83 S.E.2d 648 (1944), reversing a summary commitment to the state
school for girls based on an admission made during a hearing in which the party
committed was merely a witness.
60. State v. Coble, 181 N.C. 554, 107 S.E. 132 (1921). Fla. Stat. Ann. §
39.02(5) (1957).
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ably amenable to the special rehabilitative treatment of the juvenile
court system. However, there are two situations in these substantive
jurisdictions where the remand might prove troublesome. The first
of these results from the fact that in some substantive states where
minority and juvenility are not coextensive, the juvenile court's juris-
diction continues only as long as the offender qualifies as a juvenile.61
Certainly, where the delay in bringing the offender before the court
is attributable to the prosecuting officials, and perhaps in all of the
three above mentioned hypotheses, the offender's discharge would be
mandatory, no matter how serious the offense.62 The second situation
arises where the statute expressly giving the juvenile court exclusive
jurisdiction has been construed as not applying to murder or other
heinous crimes2 3 Therefore, a juvenile offender is tried, convicted,
and sentenced by a regular criminal court. In a subsequent case,64
former authorities are overruled and the criminal court is held to be
without jurisdiction. The grounds for the reversal are that the ex-
clusive jurisdiction conferred by the statute on the juvenile court was
without constitutional limitation, regardless of the nature of the
misconduct. Since judicial decisions are retroactive in their operation,
the accused is remanded to the custody of the juvenile court, on the
theory of a continuing jurisdiction2 The real difficulty would occur
where the remand comes about when the offender is an older person,
as explained below.Y The alternative to a remand would be the un-
conditional release of the offender.67
There may also be a case where a juvenile offender is not appre-
61. Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 222, 188 S.W. 370 (1916). Under
some statutes, the upper age limit of juvenile delinquency is co-extensive with
minority. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 45-221 (1947).
62. Mattingly v. Commonwealth, supra note 61. See also Williams v. Huff,
142 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1944) where arraignment of appellant was delayed nearly
two years without explanation while he was confined to the reformatory. The
court noted that proceedings against a child should not be delayed in order to
try him as adults are tried, but that it would not assume that the delay in this
case was for this purpose.
63. In re Mei, 122 N.J. Eq. 125, 192 Atl. 80 (1937).
64. State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21 (1954).
65. Johnson v. State, 31 N.J. Super. 382, 106 A.2d 560, aff'd, 18 N.J. 422, 114
A.2d 1 (1955). In State v. Smigelski, 137 N.J.L. 149, 58 A.2d 780 (1948), appeal
dismissed, 1 N.J. 31, 61 A.2d 583 (1948), it was held, following the ruling in Mei,
that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction in cases involving a child under sixteen
years of age when the indictment was for murder. However, following the Mona-
han decision, the court set aside the conviction of Smigelski and turned him over
to juvenile authorities. See In re Smigelski, Docket No. 147-52, N.J. Super. (L),
April 9, 1954.
66. See text supported by note 71 infra.
67. State v. Spruell, Docket No. 147-52, N.J. Super. (L), April 9, 1954 (1952
manslaughter conviction set aside on the basis of State v. Monahan).
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hended until long after the commission of the offense, and the offense
is one to which a statute of limitations applies in the case of adult
offenders.68 However, the criminal statute of limitations is not ap-
plicable where the act is not a crime, and none of the juvenile court
statutes have limitation periods. Under the procedural approach,
there is no problem. Under the substantive approach, where jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate delinquency does not extend beyond minority, this
jurisdictional limitation will in itself operate in lieu of a statute of
limitations. On the other hand, where jurisdiction is not thus limited,
the anomaly becomes serious. While an adult criminal would not be
subject to any action for an offense against which the statute of limi-
tations had run, a man sixty-five years of age who was arrested for
an offense committed as a juvenile, even though his conduct as an
adult had been exemplary, would be subject to the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. It follows, therefore, that under these circumstances,
if the same act were committed by an adult, and by a juvenile, not
only does the juvenile court act Dot afford greater protection to the
juvenile, but it would appear to discriminate against him.,* It is
conceded that this particular anomaly would not arise as to those
68. At common law, the expiration of time does not operate to bar the prose-
cution of a defendant for the commission of a crime. The matter is now usually
covered by statute. Generally, an indictment for the acceptance of a bribe by a
public official must be found and the information filed within six years. The
period is usually three years in the case of other felonies, and one year for any
misdemeanor. While in the majority of jurisdictions the statute of limitations is
available as a defense only and is waived if not properly raised by the defendant,
in some states the running of the statute is jurisdictional.
69. Another form of discrimination is imprisonment of a child until majority
for a relatively minor offense, which if committed by an adult might result in a
shorter period of incarceration. In Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl.
198 (1905), the offense was petit larceny for which adults were subject to a
maximum jail sentence of two years. Under the "parens patriae" notion adopted
in that case, if the offender was "treated" until majority, the period of incarcera-
tion would be seven years. See also Ex parte Nichols, 110 Cal. 651, 43 Pac. 9
(1896), where an adult could be punished for petit larceny by imprisonment for
only six months, whereas the term of detention in reform schools for the same
offense could be made greater by the judgment of the court, e.g., petitioner under
18 was committed to reform school "until he should be twenty-one or unless sooner
and legally discharged." Held constitutional. Commitment to reform school is
not imprisonment, object of statute was not punishment but reformation, dis-
cipline and education. It should be noted that in some jurisdictions the period of
incarceration extends beyond majority. But see, 18 U.S.C. § 5034 (1952), which
eliminates this form of discrimination. See also, Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473,
88 Pac. 609 (1907), setting aside a juvenile court judgment committing a thirteen-
year-old boy who had pilfered a box of cigars (petit larceny) as a delinquent
child to the State Industrial School "until he shall attain age of twenty-one years
unless sooner released by board of control.. ." Id. at 475, 88 Pac. at 610.
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types of criminal offenses to which the statute of limitations does not
apply.
70
However, other serious problems are presented in any attempt by
a juvenile court to adjudge an older person a juvenile delinquent.
Either the adult would have led a law-abiding life, or he would not.
If he had led an exemplary life, there would be no purpose in reform-
ing him. If, on the other hand, he had become a hardened criminal in
the meantime, it would be impossible to reform him, for his recidivis-
tic tendencies would have crystallized into chronic criminality. The
only remaining reason for his being in juvenile court at all would be
the sociological fear of a criminal trial acting as a traumatic experi-
ence which might have serious repercussions in later life. Such an
argument, in the case of an older person, is patently absurd. Thus,
the reasons underlying the paternalism of the juvenile court no longer
being applicable, there would not seem to be any excuse for depriving
the offender of his constitutional rights. In addition, there looms large
the impotence of the juvenile court to implement appropriately an
adjudication of juvenile delinquency on the part of an older person,
except for a few jurisdictions.7 1 Yet, if the acquisition of jurisdiction
in the juvenile court is automatic and under the substantive approach
continues indefinitely beyond majority, it is certainly logical to con-
clude that a person's age at the time of the proceeding is wholly im-
material to the question of jurisdiction. And if the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court is retained beyond a certain age, it could well be the
means of depriving persons of constitutional guarantees long after
the justification for doing so had passed.7 2
70. There is no limitation in the case of some felonies, such as murder, the
embezzlement of public funds, and the falsification of public records.
71. Colo. Stat. Ann. 22-8-1(3) (1953), provides that a child over sixteen whose
delinquency is chronic or repeated, or would otherwise amount to commission of a
felony, may be committed to any state institution as if convicted in criminal
court for felony. In most cases, New York statutes do not deal with persons over
twenty-one, but N.Y. Penal Laws § 2185 in some instances allows for the "care"
of offenders from the ages of sixteen through thirty. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 279,
§ 33 (1957), provides as follows: "if committed to said reformatory as a delin-
quent child, he may be held therein for not more than two years .... "
72. To show how the deprivation of liberties in juvenile court could lead to
depriving a large segment of our population of its constitutionally guaranteed
liberties, see art. 3(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 109 (1950),
50 U.S.C. 553 (1952), which authorized courts-martial of former servicemen for
certain crimes committed during service and for which the accused could not be
tried in any federal court. In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 305 U.S. 11
(1955), this act was declared unconstitutional, because it would deny a federal
guarantee of trial by jury to the accused. Minton, J., dissenting, conceded that a
civilian not under the jurisdiction of the Military Code has a right to be tried in a
civil court for an alleged crime as a civilian, but argued that the defendant had a
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However, the instances of adults coming before the juvenile courts
are not confined solely to those who are, correctly or otherwise,
thought to be in the jurisdiction of these courts because of offenses
committed as juveniles.73 Express provisions are to be found in the
juvenile court statutes relating to adults who contribute to juvenile
delinquency or dependency.74 Adults may also appear before the
juvenile court as witnesses. As has been noted by an advocate of the
juvenile court,
Logically and practically, it is not bound in law to observe the
jury trial rules of Evidence. Nevertheless, it deals with adults in
their relation to dependent and delinquent children .... For this
reason, ... it becomes a question how far the judge should con-
sider himself morally bound to observe at least the fundamental
framework of the jury-trial rules. There is contant pressure
from lay-advisers to eliminate "technicalities." On the other
hand, since the juvenile-court methods are due to be extended
conditional discharge only, and that the United States clearly reserved the right
to charge and try him by court-martial for a crime committed which was com-
mitted while the defendant was in the status of soldier. Id. at 44 (dissenting
opinion). This is analogous to the juvenile court's indefinite extension of jurisdic-
tion. The majority rejected Minton's argument because it felt that through the
instrument of "conditional" discharges, the military could extend its jurisdiction
indefinitely, and deprive any veteran later accused of crime while in the services
of a right to trial by jury.
In this connection it should be noted that the uncontrolled extension of juvenile
court jurisdiction could be more flagrant than the extension of military juris-
diction, because not all segments of the population serve in the military and thus
come under its jurisdiction, while, in addition to adults who come within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts (see note 74 infra), everybody is at one time
a juvenile, and might be later accused of offenses while occupying that status.
Moreover, juvenility being a status, the legislature could constitutionally extend
the juvenile court's jurisdiction, with its accompanying deprivation of liberty,
simply by further raising the upper age limits for juveniles. To do so would
contradict the principle that a legislature can only depart from a constitution
by constitutional amendments. See Crane, J., dissenting in People v. Lewis, 260
N.Y. 171, 180, 183 N.E. 353, 356 (1932): "Can a child be deprived of his liberty,
taken from his home and parents, and incarcerated in an institution for a term
of years, by changing the name of the offense from 'burglary' or 'larceny' to
'juvenile delinquency'? If the Legislature can thus wipe out constitutional pro-
tection by changing a name, the substance and reality remaining the same, at
what age of an accused does this power begin and end?".
73. "Acts or omissions of adults in regard to children come under legal cog-
nizance in three classes of cases-first, those in which an adult is accused of a
crime against a minor; second, those in which the adult has failed to fulfill a
duty toward a minor; and third, those in which the adult is accused of causing,
or tending to cause, juvenile delinquency or dependency." Flexner & Oppenheimer,
The Legal Aspect of the Juvenile Court, 57 Am. L. Rev. 65, 82 (1923).
74. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-822A (1956).
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gradually to adult offenders in some fields, it is needful to build
up a system that will not depart too radically from accepted tra-
ditions of criminal procedure.7 5
In some jurisdictions, however, the danger of the possible depriva-
tion of civil liberties presented by the extension of the juvenile court
system to adults has to some extent been alleviated. This has been
accomplished by decisions76 holding, in the absence of statutes, that
the informality applied to the disposition of juvenile offenders is not
applicable in the case of adults who contribute to juvenile delinquency.
There are also express statutory provisions to the same effect.7 7 Nev-
ertheless, there are decisions which indiscriminately deny the applica-
bility of the usual procedural safeguards to anyone appearing before
a juvenile court.78
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
Apart from litigation concerning protections ordinarily guaranteed
by the state and federal constitutions, there is a paucity of statutes
and decisions on the applicability of the rules of evidence in the
juvenile court.
Statutory attempts have been made to delineate the boundary be-
tween traditional criminal court procedures and the informal hearing
concept of the juvenile court. However, even these relatively bold
statutes have been watered down by vagueness, and have varied
greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.7 9 Consequently, broad pow-
75. 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 4d (4) (3d ed. 1940).
76. State v. Campbell, 177 La. 559, 148 So. 708 (1933) ; Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah
473, 88 Pac. 609 (1907).
77. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:1573 (1950), gives the procedure in cases of
adults. "In the trial of adults coming within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, the proceeding shall be in the same manner and subject to the same rules
of procedure, evidence, etc., as the trial of an adult on a misdemeanor charge in
any other court of criminal jurisdiction, except that an adult may waive his
right to a public trial. Furthermore, whenever the judge, in his discretion, shall
decide that the accused should be represented by counsel and that he is unable to
procure or employ counsel, the court before whom he shall be tried shall assign
counsel consisting of one or more members of the Louisiana Bar." See also Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-822B (1956).
78. Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942), where a juvenile court of
Washington, D.C., handled an adult for failing to support his minor child in the
same informal manner as it did for juvenile delinquency adjudications. See also
Department of Pub. Welfare v. Barlow, 80 Ariz. 249, 296 P.2d 298 (1956).
79. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.09 (2) (1957) ("Hearings shall be conducted by the
judge without a jury, applying the rules of evidence in use in equity cases in
the circuit courts .... "); Md. Ann. Code art. 26, § 59 (1951) ("Hearings shall
be conducted in an informal manner .... "); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.020 (1949)
([City of St. Louis and counties with population over 50,000] "The practice and
procedure prescribed by law for the conduct of criminal cases shall govern in all
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ers of discretion have been vested in juvenile court judges to decide
upon their own rules of procedure0 with the inevitable "capricious
results" of basing decisions concerning fundamental constitutional
protections upon "day to day opinions.""'
There are cases in which a court denies a particular right outright
without affirming any other rights; however, the surrounding circum-
stances may be such that these decisions ought to be binding in future
juvenile court cases only where the fact situations are similar. In
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 2 for example, it appeared that a boy four-
teen years of age was indicted for larceny and pleaded not guilty.
After the indictment, the district attorney certified that a prosecution
was not required, and the juvenile court committed the defendant to
the House of Refuge. This case has been widely cited 3 for the propo-
sition that by changing the nomenclature of the proceeding from a
"9criminal trial" to a "civil inquiry," the state may deprive a child of
his liberty without a trial by jury, notwithstanding the fact that the
constitutions of the United States 84 and of the state5 provide for trial
by jury in all cases except impeachment. However, the courts citing
this case most often overlook the fact that the youth had counsel.
Moreover, it is indicated in the opinion of the intermediate appellate
court- that the defendant, through his attorney, waived his oppor-
tunity for a trial on the criminal side of the court.8 7 There was an-
proceedings .. . in which the child stands charged with the violation of the
criminal statutes of the state, and in such proceedings, the child, his parent, or
any person standing in loco parentis to him may on his behalf demand a trial
by jury. In all other cases the trial shall be before the court without a jury,
and the practice and procedure customary in proceedings in equity shall govern,
except where otherwise provided herein."); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.340 (1949) ([In
counties with population under 50,000] "The court shall have power to devise
and publish rules and regulate the procedure.").
Classification by counties does not render the act unconstitutional as a local
or special act. The reasonableness of the classification is based on the theory
that different conditions in the cities and rural communities call for different
treatment. On the question of reasonable classification, see Ex parte Loving,
178 Mo. 194, 77 S.W. 508 (1903).
80. Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-26 (1953) provides, "The court may conduct the
hearing in an informal manner, and may adopt any form of procedure in such
cases which it deems best suited to ascertain the facts."
81. The language quoted is from Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 141 (1947)
and Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948) (dissenting opinions).
82. 213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl. 198 (1905).
83. In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 Pac. 467 (1924).
84. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
85. Pa. Const. art. I, § 9.
86. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 27 Pa. Super. 175 (1903).
87. "If demand for a trial by jury was made in the court below, it does not
appear upon the record .... In view of the provisions of the act, we can see no
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other circumstance which contradicts the court's avowed intention,
viz., not to punish the child, but merely to act in the manner of a
kindly parent. This was a subsequent opinion written by Mr. Justice
Brown, eight years later on the relation of the state to delinquent
children, in which he stated,
[T]he relation established by the order of the Juvenile Court
... is really penal in its nature.... Such of these children as are
"incorrigible" are quasi-criminals. They have been apprehended
for wrongs committed by them. All of these children are, in
effect, prisoners.-
There are cases where the courts deny one right but affirm other
rights,- or merely qualify one right while affirming other rights.90
Might not a decision that there is no necessity for warning as to self-
incrimination be merely a qualification of the right, rather than a
denial of the right itself? The Lewis case, which held that this warn-
ing was not necessary, is often cited 91 as authority for an outright
denial of the privilege against self-incrimination. However, the Cal-
ifornia court, while holding that the warning is not necessary, has
upheld the privilege where it was claimed.92 In Texas, compelling
juveniles charged with delinquency to testify against themselves was
held error; 9- a subsequent holding, however, permitted a minor to
testify against himself without being warned of his rights, while at
the same time making a clear distinction between the failure to warn,
and forcing the child to testify against himself 4 If it is thought that
a constitutional right should not be entirely denied, then it is felt that
any qualification of the particular right is a dangerous judicial half-
step.
There are also cases which deny or qualify a procedural rule only
difficulty whatever in a defendant, or anyone for him who may be interested in
securing his constitutional right of trial by jury, having such a trial. Whenever
evidence of the denial of such a right is brought to the attention of an appellate
court, it will probably not be necessary to declare this act unconstitutional, in
order to remedy the evil, but simply to return the case for a regular trial by
jury, if it should appear that such a trial was denied." Id. at 182-83.
88. Black v. Graham, 238 Pa. 381, 385-86, 86 Atl. 266 (1913).
89. Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
973 (1955) ; In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952) ; Dendy
v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944); Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473,
88 Pac. 609 (1907).
90. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932); Ballard v. State, 192
S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
91. Cf. Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954); Mont Appeal, 175
Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954).
92. In re Tahbel, 46 Cal. App. 755, 189 Pac. 804 (1920).
93. Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 176 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
94. Ballard v. State, 192 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
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as it applied to a particular group within the purview of the juvenile
court. Such treatment, although unequal, is not constitutionally ob-
jectionable if based upon reasonable classification. An example is the
requirement of sworn testimony for an adjudication of juvenile delin-
quency. It would seem that many courts require that testimony in
juvenile court given by adults be sworn, but excuse juveniles from the
solemnity of being sworn because it is felt that the child does not
appreciate the nature of the oath. A failure to perceive this distinc-
tion may give the impression of apparent inconsistencies regarding
the swearing of witnesses as between the several jurisdictions and
even within a particular jurisdiction. In Mill v. Brown," for example,
involving the question of parental rights, the statute in force5 pro-
vided that a parent responsible for or contributing to the child's
delinquency should be guilty of a misdemeanor, guilt to be determined
by the juvenile court in a summary manner. That portion of the
statute was held unconstitutional as denying a parent the right of a
criminal trial. The court also indicated that witnesses should be
examined under oath. This suggestion has matured into a definite
requirement for sworn testimony in the decisions of other jurisdic-
tions which have nevertheless recognized that there might be certain
circumstances where the oath could properly be dispensed with. 7
However, in a subsequent Utah case9s the appellate court held it was
unnecessary to place children under oath where the juvenile court
95. Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 88 Pac. 609 (1907).
96. Utah Laws c. 117, § 7 (1905).
97. In re Ross, 45 Wash. 2d 654, 277 P.2d 335 (1954), where the lower court
was reversed because of a failure of the juvenile court judge to comply with the
request that all witnesses be sworn. The court says: "This statement is not to
be tortured into a holding that all witnesses must be sworn in all juvenile court
proceedings. It has long been recognized that informality and friendly discussion
can, under many circumstances, attain the best results with juveniles and their
parents." The court went on to say that at the hearing proper witnesses must
be sworn and "at such hearings, the usual rules relative to the admissibility of
evidence should be applied." Id. at 655, 277 P.2d at 336. To the same effect is
In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (BMunic. Ct. App., D.C. 1953) (decision based on unsworn
statements by the daughter alleged to be beyond the control of the mother, by
the mother, the mother's attorney, and the social worker employed by the juvenile
court).
98. State v. Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951), where the testi-
mony concerned indecent advances made by a fourteen-year-old boy to girls in
the lower grades of an elementary school. The juvenile court had apparently
felt that the administration of an oath would merely serve to increase the chil-
dren's anxiety without a corresponding increased impression on them of the duty
to speak the truth. It is, nevertheless, felt that the girls' evidence, particularly
inasmuch as it described acts of violence against themselves, was likely to be
acute and reliable. The unsworn testimony of the fourteen-year-old accused was
also admitted, but the court offered to swear him in, if counsel desired it.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1958/iss2/1
DETERMINATION OF DELINQUENCY
deemed it advisable to allow children to testify without being sworn.
This holding was made on the theory that although children did not
understand the meaning of an oath because of their age, they were
nevertheless likely to state the truth. On the other hand, some courts
dispense with the necessity of an oath for everyone in their zeal to
convince the world that the juvenile court judge and probation officer
are friends of the offender, and not "the avengers of offended law." 9
The judicial decisions'," and express statutory provisions-, which
purport to require less rigorous rules of proof in a delinquency case
than in a criminal trial for the same offense have, in the main, not
only been vague, but have failed to distinguish between the probative
force of the evidence on the one hand, and the degree of persuasion
(which has no effect on the rules of admissibility) on the other. Some
courts are fond of reciting from the celebrated Lewis case' 02 that
The customary rules of evidence shown by long experience as
essential to getting at the truth with reasonable certainty in civil
trials must be adhered to. The finding of fact must rest on the
preponderance of evidence adduced under those rules ....
In addition, some statutes prescribe the rules of evidence used in
equity cases,'"' others declare hearsay and opinion evidence to be ad-
missible,U4 and still others are not confined to or bound by technical
rules of procedure.'15
Historically, there were two distinct systems of evidence, one at
99. State v. Scholl, 167 Wis. 504, 510-11, 167 N.W. 830, 832 (1918): "[W]e
regard the proceedings taken as entirely sufficient, although no witness was sworn.
The investigations of the probation officer and the facts brought out by the kindly
questioning of the judge upon the hearing substantiate the fact of delinquency
fully as well as sworn testimony." Even in this case the court stressed the fact
that the only action taken was to place the delinquents on probation, and not to
incarcerate them in an institution. In the latter case, sworn testimony would be
proper before a final disposition.
100. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932); other cases in Annot.,
43 A.L.R.2d 1128, 1138.
101. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.02(2) (1957); La. Rev. Stat. 13:1579(1) (1950);
R.I. Stat. 14-1-30 (1956).
102. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 178, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932). See also
Carmean v. People, 110 Colo. 399, 134 P.2d 1056 (1943) (rev'd for insufficiency
of proof); Garner v. Wood, 188 Ga. 463, 4 S.E.2d 137 (1939).
103. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.02(2) (1957).
104. La. Rev. Stat. 13:1579(1) (1950). See McCormick, Evidence 458 (1954):
"[T]he main justification for the exclusion of hearsay . . . . is the lack of op-
portunity for the adversary to cross-examine the absent declarant whose out-of-
court statement is reported by the witness." The nature of the safeguard which
hearsay lacks is indicated by Chancellor Kent in Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Com.
L. R. 44 (N.Y. 1812).
105. R.I. Stat. 14-1-30 (1956) : "The court may dispense with the strict rules
of evidence."
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common law, and one in chancery. 0,0 Nevertheless, the rules as to
admissibility of evidence, which developed at common law, were al-
ways accepted in chancery.10 7 Although within the common law courts
themselves the general rules and tests as to admissibility and rele-
vancy of evidence are the same in civil and criminal cases, 08 there
may be a difference in their application. 0 9 In the quantitative evalua-
tion of proof, as opposed to rules of admissibility, there are actual
106. 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 4 (3d ed. 1940).
107. "But it seems to have been conceded (or professed) from the first by the
Court of Chancery (according to its maxim that Equity follows the Law) that it
accepted the rules of the common law as to the admissibility of evidence. [Citing
Henley v. Philips, 2 Ark. 48, 26 Eng. Rep. 426 (Ch. 1740).] Its own methods of
taking evidence continued, as of course; but it recognized the bindingness of the
common law rules, and professed to apply them except so far as the method of
written deposition made a modification necessary. There was in truth compara-
tively little field for controversy ... partly because criminal cases and many
civil issues which might raise common questions of evidence were wholly with-
drawn from the cognizance of chancery.
"The orthodox and broad proposition, then, always was and has continued to
be that the rules of Evidence at common law trials obtained also in chancery."
Ibid.
Wigmore points out, however, that there were actually two systems of rules,
distinct in history and method. The four main differences may be summarized
as follows: (1) In chancery, testimony was taken in writing, instead of orally.
Cross-interrogatories had to be framed even before the interrogatories were
known. Thus, cross-examination, which was axiomatic at common law, was
effectively "emasculated" in equity. (2) Chancery courts enforced the tradition
of the canon law, requiring two witnesses to every material allegation. This was
rejected by the common law. See 7 id. § 2032. (3) Equity granted discovery be-
fore and during trial, whereas at common law, a party opponent could refuse to
disclose any of his evidence at any time. (4) There were a few variant rules,
which were really rules of procedure or of substantive law.
108. "[T]he occasional appearance . . . of the title 'Criminal Evidence' has
tended to foster the fallacy that there is some separate group of rules or some
large number of modifications .... The fallacy . . .has had repeatedly to be
repudiated." 1 id. § 4.
109. A few rules of admissibility are modified or created for criminal issues
due to the special considerations which may arise. For example, admissible but
uncorroborated evidence may not be sufficient for a criminal conviction. Accord-
ing to the general rule, a defendant cannot be convicted on the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice (one who can be charged and convicted of the same
offense as that charged to the principal offender). Testimony given by an ac-
complice may be of questionable reliability because of selfish motives. Merely
changing the nomenclature of the offense, and adjudging it juvenile delinquency
rather than a crime, would scarcely serve to increase the reliability of the accom-
plice's testimony. But some courts have held otherwise. See State v. David, 226
La. 268, 76 So. 2d 1 (1954). Other rules of admissibility are applicable solely to
criminal cases because they are the only cases where certain issues arise, for
example, presumption of innocence, dying declarations, the rule of corroboration
in perjury.
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differences, both between the equity and common law courts and
between civil and criminal trials within the common law courts.
While the rule of proof in criminal cases is "beyond a reasonable
doubt,"1 " a mere "preponderancy of the evidence" suffices for civil
cases.- In equity, where the chancellor reviewed the vice-chancellor's
finding of fact as well as of law, there developed a sort of intermediate
standard of proof, in the form of a requirement that the evidence be
"clear and convincing." It is argued that the various standards for
burden or proof and measure of persuasion are helpful as a guide for
instructing juries, but that in the many jurisdictions which deny a
trial by jury to accused juveniles, a competent judge does not require
any such distinction."12 However, in many jurisdictions juvenile court
judges are laymen, and even where they are legally-trained, there are
some courts which have felt that each of the several standards will
convey a distinct meaning to the mind of a judge sitting without a
jury in a juvenile case." 3
If this is correct, then it is ironical to say that "beyond a reasonable
doubt" is a device to prevent punishment in the wrong cases, or that
the courts need not be so cautious in a juvenile case since the aim is
not punishment but rehabiiltation, and the consequences of error are
not quite so serious. The theory behind this argument is that the risk
of acting too quickly is not so great as the risk of failing to act alto-
gether. This stand, which superficially might seem sound, simply
reflects another aspect of legalistic blurring together of the fact-find-
ing and dispositional phases found in every delinquency case.1 4 In
addition, the advocates of such a theory fail to perceive that on net
balance, society gains more and loses less by delaying treatment even
where required, than by indiscriminately administering such treat-
ment prematurely in a case where it is not required at all. This argu-
ment further presupposes that the commendable aims and purposes of
110. The state must prove the essential elements of criminal liability beyond a
reasonable doubt. This doubt must be of a type that would cause one to hesitate
when confronted with the "graver transactions of life" or the "important affairs
of life." See State v. Taylor, 76 Idaho 358, 283 P.2d 582 (1955).
111. To sustain the burden of proof, the evidence based on something more
than pure speculation must show that the existence of the fact claimed is more
probable than its non-existence. See Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 307
Mass. 246, 29 N.E.2d 825 (1940).
112. This argument has no factual basis in history, since there were no juries
in chancery.
113. In a minority of jurisdictions, a child has an absolute right to elect a jury
trial. D.C. Code Ann. § 11-915 (1951); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 102 (1951);
Ex parte Hollowell, 84 Okla. Crim. 355, 182 P.2d 771 (1947); Tex. Stat., Rev.
Civ. art. 2334 (1950); Colo. Rev. Stat. c. 101, art. 1, § 105-1-7 (1953).
114. See note 10 supra.
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juvenile court treatment are actually translated into practice, which,
unfortunately, is not the case in most jurisdictions. 11
Similarly, a failure to distinguish between rules of admissibility
(which should not and do not substantially vary between civil and
criminal proceedings) and the degree of proof necessary to sustain
the burden of persuasion (which does vary) may result in the admis-
sion of hearsay (or unsworn testimony, which is only another form of
hearsay) evidence.1 , However, the impulse to "paternalize" the rules
of admissibility may be so great that even in some jurisdictions recog-
nizing this distinction, hearsay testimony may be admissible.?" As
has previously been noted, 1 7a special rules of evidence have been de-
vised for use in criminal trials, because of the specialized situations
which might arise therein, having no counterpart in civil trials. Yet,
many cases and statutes requiring the same kind of proof for an
adjudication of delinquency as would be required in an ordinary civil
action leave the juvenile court with no adequate fact-finding machin-
ery to cope with facts unique in criminal proceedings. Recognizing
this apparent dilemma, some decisions have required proof beyond a
reasonable doubt where the alleged act of delinquency is criminal in
nature."
In discussing the procedural safeguards connected with problems
of proof in the juvenile court, emphasis is often given the right to
trial by jury."19 It has been argued that where a jurisdiction, either
by statute or decision, denies the right to trial by jury, assuming that
it is a basic right, then by a parity of reasoning the right to counsel
115. See note 8 supra.
116. See In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 975 (1955); Mont Appeal, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954); State v.
Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951); In re Bentley, 246 Wis. 69,
16 N.W.2d 390 (1944).
117. In the matter of Lewis, 11 N.J. 217, 221, 94 A.2d 328, 330 (1953), the
court said, "[T]he real question . . .is whether the evidence, viewed in its en-
tirety, was such that the trial judge could properly find therefrom, beyond rea-
sonable doubt, that the deaths were the result of the appellant's careless and
heedless operation of the car," thus indicating that in New Jersey criminal law
standards are applied to burden of proof. However, the admission of hearsay
evidence in juvenile delinquency proceedings is not error in New Jersey. Camp-
bell v. Siegler, 10 N.J. Misc. 987, 162 Atl. 154 (1932).
117a. See note 109 supra.
118. In the matter of Lewis, 11 N.J. 217, 94 A.2d 328 (1953); People v. Fitz-
gerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927) ; In re Rich, 86 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1949) ;
In re Madik, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y. Supp. 765 (1931); Jones v. Common-
wealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
See Waite, How Far Can Court Procedure be Socialized Without Impairing
Individual Rights?, 12 J.Crim. L., C. & P.S. 339, 344 (1921), advocating the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard when the offense is criminal in nature.
119. See Ludwig, Youth and Law 40 (1955).
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should also be denied.1-0 It is submitted that the right to counsel, as
guaranteed by the federal and various state constitutions, is not only
applicable to the juvenile court, but that the court is obliged to imple-
ment this basic guarantee by advising the juvenile of his rights to
counsel, and appointing counsel for him where he has none of his own.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution grants a
right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions.121 A trial court must
advise the accused of this right, and if he is financially unable to hire
a lawyer, the court must assign one to him.1 22 Representation by coun-
sel must be effective and timely. The accused is entitled to the aid of
an attorney at every stage of the proceedings. If the counsel repre-
sents anyone besides the accused, there must be no possibility of an
inconsistency between the interests of these other persons and those
of the accused. 12  When the accused waives his right to counsel, it is
the court's duty to determine whether he has done so intelligently
and competentlyl i and it must consider every reasonable presumption
against such a waiver. 12 5 Since a failure to comply with the constitu-
tional guarantee of a right to counsel is a jurisdictional defect, subse-
quent proceedings are rendered wholly void.12 6
Although the sixth amendment is not directed to proceedings in the
120. People v. Dotsen, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956) ; People v. Fifield,
136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955). But see Ex parte Echols, 245 Ala.
353, 17 So. 2d 449 (1944).
121. U.S. Const. amend. VI, provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fense."
122. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). "If the defendant appears in
court without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel, and
assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the proceeding, unless he elects
to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel. Fed. R. Crim. P. 44.
See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 5 (b), 15 (c), 40 (b) (2).
123. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725 (1948) ; In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455
(D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953).
While a preliminary hearing does not finally decide guilt or innocence, yet
temporary restraint of the accused's personal liberty is involved, and therefore
it would seem that all procedural safeguards ought to be applicable. Moreover,
effective aid of counsel in preparing a case may be precluded if the case is decided
in a preliminary hearing. However, due process under the fourteenth amendment
does not demand that a defendant have counsel at the arraignment, so long as
the accused has ample time to take advantage of every defense which would have
been available originally. Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82 (1946). Cf. Shiou-
takon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666, 670 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1956): "We do
not hold that counsel is essential in the preliminary stages before a petition is
filed."
124. Von Moltke v. Gillies, supra note 123.
125. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
126. Id. at 467; Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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state courts,127 nevertheless, all of the states have some express or im-
plied constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel.128 Moreover, a
denial of the right to counsel may constitute a violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment 129 because the right is
regarded as essential to the substance of a hearing. The measure of
the right is determined by what the court considers to be "of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," rather than the sixth amend-
ment, which is directed to proceedings and rules which prevail in the
federal courts only.30 This is true not only in state prosecutions of
capital offenses, 131 but also in non-capital cases where exceptional cir-
cumstances are involved. 132 Among the "exceptional circumstances"
cases are those involving young and immature defendants who in
many jurisdictions would come within either the exclusive or con-
current purview of a juvenile court.
In De Meerleer v. Michigan,33 a seventeen-year-old was not advised
of the right to counsel or of the serious nature of the plea of guilty to
a first degree murder charge. It was held that the youth's unfamiliar-
ity with legal proceedings resulted in a serious impairment of his
constitutional rights at the arraignment.
In Marino v. Ragen,'3"' the accused was convicted of murder in 1925
on a plea of guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment. At that time
he was eighteen years old and had migrated to the United States from
Italy only two years previously. Not only was the accused unfamiliar
with American trial court procedure, but he did not even understand
English. One of his two interpreters at the arraignment was the
arresting officer. No attorney was appointed to represent the accused.
127. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
128. In Virginia, the only state that does not have an express constitutional
provision comparable to the Federal Constitution's sixth amendment, the court
has ruled that the right to counsel is included in the Virginia constitutional pro-
visions forbidding deprivation of life or liberty "except by the law of the land."
Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 351, 46 S.E.2d 413 (1948). Statutory pro-
visions require court appointment of counsel in all felony cases. Va. Code §§
19-167, 19-214.1 (1950). In cities of 100,000 to 160,000, the courts are authorized
to "appoint public defenders. Va. Code § 19-7 (1950).
Moreover, nine state constitutions expressly extend the right to civil cases, as
do the federal courts. The nine states are: Alabama, Georgia, Maine, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nevada, New York, Utah and Wisconsin. The federal case that
extends it is In re Mandell, 69 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1934).
129. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 327 (1937) (dictum).
130. Ibid.
131. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
132. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
133. 329 U.S. 663 (1947).
134. 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
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In view of the foregoing, the United States Supreme Court held that
habeas corpus should have been granted.
In Haley v. Ohio,135 a fifteen-year-old Negro boy's conviction of
murder in the first degree and sentence to life imprisonment was
based on his coerced confession. One circumstance which influenced
the Court to set aside the conviction was that during and after the
investigation, the boy was held incommunicado and denied the ser-
vices of a lawyer.
Wade v. Mayo",; presented the case of an eighteen-year-old charged
with breaking and entering. Claiming that he had no funds with
which to employ counsel himself, he requested that the trial judge
appoint counsel to represent him. This request was refused. In set-
ting aside the conviction, the Court said, "There are some individuals
who, by reason of age, ignorance or mental incapacity are incapable
of representing themselves adequately in a prosecution of a relatively
simple nature. . . ." Where such incapacity is present, the refusal to
appoint counsel is a denial of due process of law under the fourteenth
amendment.
In Uveges v. Pennsylvania"7 a seventeen-year-old who had pleaded
guilty to a charge of burglary was entitled to habeas corpus because
he had not been advised of his right to counsel. Nor had any attempt
been made by the court to make the accused understand the conse-
quences of his plea.
The United States Supreme Court has thus far declined to concern
itself with the question of the right to counsel in the juvenile court.
But a few statutes, and a substantial number of federal and state
decisions, do.,- Unlike the privilege against self-incrimination, which
is sometimes denied outright and sometimes qualified,1 3 there are
few, if any, decisions absolutely denying the right to counsel. The
qualification of the right to counsel, however, is somewhat analogous
135. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
136. 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
137. 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
138. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 45-217 (1947); Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1(4) (1953);
Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply to proceedings of the Juvenile
Court of the District of Columbia (United States v. White, 153 F. Supp, 809
(D.D.C. 1957). However, in Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, the court based
its holding on a "right to be heard" provision (D.C. Code § 11-915 (1940)) requir-
ing the effective assistance of counsel in the juvenile court, as at any criminal
court. In re Poulin, 129 A.2d 672 (N.H. 1957), interpreted the provisions of a stat-
ute authorizing presence at juvenile court hearing of persons "necessary in the
interests of justice" as satisfying requirements of due process when it entitled
either the juvenile or his parents to have counsel present.
139. In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 Pac. 467 (1924); see note 91 supra.
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to the qualification of the privilege against self-incrimination. The
common reason assigned to justify qualification is that the hearing is
an integral part of the treatment process. This emphasizes the re-
habilitative, non-criminal, nature of the proceedings, and fails to
distinguish the fact-finding from the dispositional phase of the hear-
ing. With reference to the principle against self-incrimination, it is
feared that if a child is warned that he need not testify the resultant
delay in the treatment outweighs the value of the privilege.10 Simi-
larly, the qualifiers of the right to counsel, although conceding that
this privilege cannot be denied altogether, feel that the very presence
of counsel is contrary to the spirit of a non-adversary proceeding.14
Therefore, they argue, the court should not be compelled to advise a
juvenile of that right, or to secure counsel for him when he is unable
to do so for himself. In People v. Fifield,142 the court, in holding that
the constitutional and statutory rights afforded to persons charged
with a crime are not extended to juveniles, distinguished between
previous California cases, 143 in which juvenile judges refused to per-
mit minors who had engaged counsel to consult with their attorneys,
and the present case, where "the court did not expressly advise the
minor that she was entitled to be represented by counsel." The court
was careful to point out that, "Of course, no person can be deprived
of the right to be represented by an attorney in any court proceeding
if he (already) has an attorney whom he wishes to represent him."
Thus, it is clear that the juvenile court's procedure in this case does
not constitute an outright denial, but rather a mere qualification of a
constitutional privilege.
Yet, in holding that a court is under no duty to appoint counsel
without a request to do so, many juvenile court judges frequently
overlook the fact that a layman, especially a young layman without
the assistance of counsel, may not be aware of the legal defenses he
might have to answer a charge. For example, because of the court's
140. It would seem unsound to grant the privilege to adults but withdraw it
from young children who are more easily frightened. People v. Fitzgerald,
244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927). See also Williams v. Huff, 146 F.2d 867,
868 (D.C. Cir. 1944) where appellant testified that he entered a plea of guilty on
the advice of other prisoners, who informed him that such a plea would give him
a better chance for probation.
141. White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1944); Virtue, Survey of Metro-
politan Courts, Detroit Area 116 (1950). See In re Hill, 78 Cal. App. 23, 247 Pac.
591 (1926), where a lower court, which removed counsel from the courtroom on
the ground that a juvenile court proceeding is one in which no attorney may
appear as a matter of right, was reversed.
142. 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955).
143. In re McDermott, 77 Cal. App. 109, 246 Pac. 89 (1926); In re Rider,
50 Cal. App. 797, 195 Pac. 965 (1920).
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failure to advise the juvenile of his right to counsel, or to appoint
counsel, the juvenile might easily be deceived into believing that an
act which he committed is a crime and pleading guilty without having
committed the technical elements of the offense at all. 4 4 Specifically,
counsel can, before a decision as to the nature of his plea is made,
advise the accused of such things as the sufficiency of the indictment;
the possible existence of a defense or bar under facts known to the
accused, but the legal import of which he may not know; the nature
of the penalty provided for the offense charged; and the probable
extent to which it would be imposed under the facts involved, in the
event of a plea of guilty. Therefore, the argument that if counsel had
been employed for the defendant his plea would have been the same
does not follow.
In many courts, when it appears that the defendant fully under-
stands the nature of the charges against him, the absence of a request
for counsel coupled with a plea of guilty raises an implied waiver. 145
Other courts reason that a guilty plea not only indicates that the de-
fendant knows with what he is charged, but is in itself tantamount to
an express waiver of the right to counsel.146 From here the reasoning
proceeds as follows: that if the defendant knows with what he is
charged and pleads guilty, such a plea would indicate that the accused
has no defense at all. Hence, he has no need of counsel to defend him,
and the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in this case
would be wholly extraneous. However, this attitude indicates a lack
of understanding of the basic principle that a plea of guilty on
arraignment does not create evidence of the defendant's guilt, any
more than a plea of not guilty goes to prove his innocence. This argu-
ment is reminiscent of the reasoning of the English courts at the time
of the American Revolution. In England, while a defendant always
had the right to address the jury in his defense and was entitled to
counsel when charged with a misdemeanor, he had no right to be
represented by an attorney in cases of treason or felony 47 Lord
Coke's explanation, derived from continental legal procedure, was that
in cases of serious crime, the state's testimony and proof ought to be
so clear that there could be no defense to it. 14 The modern counter-
144. See Moore v. Commonwealth, 298 Ky. 14, 181 S.W.2d 413 (1944).
145. Atkins v. Sanford, 120 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1941); Odom v. Aderhold,
115 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 683 (1941).
146. Yankwich, J., in Cooke v. Swope, 28 F. Supp. 492, 494 (W.D. Wash. 1939).
147. 1 Archbold, Criminal Procedure, Pleading and Evidence 548-50 (8th ed.
1877).
148. 5 Holdsworth, History of English Law 192 (1924). But by statute of
6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1 (1836), the right to make a full answer and defense
was extended to all felony cases.
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part of this explanation is the statement of a juvenile court to the
effect that the child need not employ defense counsel because there are
no legal pitfalls against which to guard.140 In the juvenile courts,
where the great percentage of juveniles readily admit to committing
the act of which they are accused, this somewhat fallacious reasoning
is particularly favored.
The better view 50 is that if the defendant did not know of the right
to counsel and was not advised by the judge of the possibility of a
court appointment, a plea of guilty does not constitute an intelligent
and competent waiver of that right. An adult may be competent to
decide between assistance of counsel and presenting his own defense,
but even he generally will not fully understand the nature of the de-
fenses available or the scope of the ultimate issues involved. A for-
tiori, an immature juvenile cannot be assumed capable, in the absence
of legal advice, to make such an appraisal. The mere act of a juvenile
telling the judge that he is informed of his right to counsel and de-
sires to waive it does not terminate the judge's responsibility; the
judge must ascertain it for himself.
In Wiliams v. Huff,15  a federal decision not tried under a juvenile
court statute, the youth and inexperience of the defendant led to the
conclusion that there had not been a competent waiver of the right to
counsel. It appeared that appellant was first arrested when he was
fifteen years old and, without benefit of counsel at his hearing, was
committed to the reformatory. Several months later he escaped.
While he was being rearrested he struck at the arresting officer with
a penknife. Arraignment for this assault was delayed nearly two
years without explanation while appellant was confined in the reform-
atory. Thereafter he waived counsel and pleaded guilty to an indict-
ment of assault with a dangerous weapon. At the time of his applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds of denial of counsel,
appellant had been in prison for a total of nearly seven years. Ap-
pellant testified that he entered a plea of guilty on the advice of other
prisoners, who informed him that such a plea would give him a better
chance for probation." The majority of the court took the position
that appellant's competence was a question of fact in the determina-
tion of which his youth was entitled to serious consideration, but was
149. See Virtue, op. cit. supra note 141, at 115.
150. Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
151. 142 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1944); 146 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (second
appeal).
152. The appellant testified that he was fifteen at the time of the alleged
original offense and contended that the juvenile court could not waive jurisdiction
until he was sixteen under D.C. Code § 11-1914 (1940). See note 62 supra.
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not necessarily conclusive. The case was therefore remanded to the
lower court on the theory that, on the one hand, a defendant has the
burden of proving his want of competence or intelligence, and, on the
other, that the lower court must take evidence to determine whether,
in the light of his age, education, information, and all other pertinent
facts, the accused had sustained this burden. Chief Judge Edgerton,
who wrote the opinion, speaking for himself, asserted that as a matter
of law a boy of seventeen cannot competently waive his right to coun-
sel in a criminal case. Upon remand, the trial court held that he had
not sustained the burden, which finding was again appealed. The
appellate court took the position that, while in the ordinary habeas
corpus proceeding a court would be justified in disbelieving the un-
contradicted evidence of a biased witness, here the fact that appellant
was seventeen years old at the time of his plea created an inference
of fact that his waiver was not intelligent; this inference was not
rebutted by anything in the record showing that, at the time of his
plea, he was examined as to his capacity to waive intelligently his
constitutional right to counsel.
To permit a waiver by a juvenile would be tantamount to saying
that the juvenile understands the nature of the charges,15 3 the range
of allowable "treatment," and possible legal defenses to or mitigating
circumstances surrounding the charge or charges. It is submitted,
therefore, that age should not be merely an important but inconclusive
consideration on the question of competence to waive the right to
counsel. Such competence should not be viewed as a rebuttable infer-
ence of fact either. Rather, it is submitted, it should be a conclusion
of law that a juvenile in juvenile court is incompetent to waive the
right to counsel unless he secures the advice and approval of the court.
Before approving a waiver, however, the court must affirmatively
assure itself, on the basis of age, education and all other pertinent
factors, that the minor is capable of making an intelligent waiver,
and does in fact desire to do so. Where the court finds for any reason
that the alleged juvenile offender is not capable of waiving his right
to counsel, the parent or guardian, with the advice of counsel, 54 may
so waive, provided the court also finds that the parent is capable of an
intelligent waiver and that there is no conflict of interests between
153. See State v. Cronin, 220 La. 233, 241, 56 So. 2d 242, 245 (1951), where
the court reached the conclusion that a fourteen-year-old could make a competent
and intelligent waiver on the dubious grounds of (1) an inference that the girl
had sufficient judgment and knew what she was doing because she had just been
married, and (2) because she informed the judge: "Judge, I don't want no lawyers
or anyone representing me."
154. See Ex parte Echols, 245 Ala. 353, 17 So. 2d 449 (1944).
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the juvenile and his parent.155 Moreover, as said in McBride v.
Jacobs,
interested parties should be advised of their rights to counsel at
preliminary conferences, which are an important part of thejuvenile court process. But any preliminary waiver of counsel
either by parent or minor should be confirmed by the judge in
open court and on the record. 15 6
Shioutakon v. District of Columbia'5 7 involved a delinquency pro-
ceeding against a fifteen-year-old charged with having used an auto-
mobile without the owner's consent. The charge was readily admitted,
and, following a hearing in which he was not represented, the youth
was committed to a training school. The denial of a motion to vacate
the juvenile court's judgment on the ground that appellant had been
deprived of his constitutional right to counsel was affirmed by the
intermediate appellate court. This decision was reversed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which
held that advising an alleged delinquent of his right to counsel is
compatible with the objectives of the juvenile court and an integral
part of the right itself. The court, in rejecting the argument that a
juvenile is entitled to be represented by counsel only if he or his par-
ents or guardian choose to furnish one, emphasized that the stated
purpose of the right to counsel is to protect an accused from a convic-
tion resulting from his own ignorance. This important constitutional
right would thus be watered down if made to depend on the child's
intelligence and the economic position of his family.
Is there any more basis for presuming a defendant to be cognizant
of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel than to presume
that he is cognizant of a privilege against self-incrimination and other
guarantees? Or for presuming that a defendant understands the rules
governing the sufficiency of an indictment, the admissibility of evi-
dence, or the burden of proof? Moreover, how can a child without the
aid of counsel competently decide whether or not he should exercise
such other rights as may be afforded him by the juvenile court acts
and federal and state constitutions? It would seem clear that a child
within the age limits of juvenility does not generally possess the legal
skill required to exercise such rights intelligently. Is it not, therefore,
meaningless for a court to say that hearsay admitted without objec-
tion may be given its natural probative force?""8 How can a child
without counsel be in a position to object? Or, if a trial by jury is
155. McBride v. Jacobs, 247 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
156. Ibid.
157. 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
158. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
973 (1955).
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demanded, how can a child be expected to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges, prepare written requests for instructions, or make written
motions for new trial or in arrest of judgment?
This is true even in jurisdictions affording a bare minimum of
rights. A legislative attempt to deprive a person of his constitutional
rights merely by changing the name of an offense would contradict
the principle that a legislature can only depart from a constitutional
mandate by constitutional amendment. It is submitted that the right
to counsel is not satisfied by the judge who conducts the entire case
on behalf of the state.'- Nor is it satisfied by a statute providing for
the state prosecutor to act as defense attorney in juvenile court and
insisting that the proceedings should in no sense be adversary.160 For
adversary proceedings are essential not only to guard against tyranny
but to insure accuracy in the fact-finding process.'' Implementing
the right to counsel would also make meaningful the juvenile's other
constitutional guarantees, such as trial by jury, where that is pro-
vided for, or the privilege against self-incrimination.
An infant's contracts, except for necessaries, are voidable at com-
mon law, not because of an inherent want of capacity, but because the
law desires to protect the infant from the consequences of his own
immaturity. Moreover, when the property rights of an infant are the
subject of litigation, the law requires the court to appoint a guardian
ad litem for him and, if in the court's opinion his interests also re-
quire that he have counsel, the court must assign him counsel, regard-
less of the child's wishes in the matter. If the law is so solicitous of
the child's property rights, should it not, for the same or stronger
reasons, aid the child in fighting for his liberty ?162
A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The development of the juvenile court movement in the United
States has stressed the harm done to the child during the process of
trying him. There has been much concern with the detrimental as-
pects of what is assumed to be a "traumatic experience." As a matter
159. In re Coyle, 122 Ind. App. 217, 101 N.E.2d 192 (1951).
160. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 45-217 (1947); Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1(4) (1953).
161. Even if an adjudication of delinquency might not be prevented by the
presence of counsel, it might serve to insure that treatment is not predicated on
misinformation. Assistance of counsel could have prevented the situation which
arose in In re Green, 123 Ind. App. 81, 86, 108 N.E.2d 647, 649 (1952), where
the court said: "The petition reveals a star chamber proceeding whereby a boy
was torn from the custody of his parents and deprived of his liberty without a
semblance of due process . .. ."
162. See argument of Chief Judge Edgerton in Williams v. Huff, 142 F.2d
91 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
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of fact, a more formal, orderly, hearing, far from being "traumatic,"
may actually be a constructive factor in anticipatory preventive tech-
nique.1 3 That is, the very formality of the hearing may well have a
sobering, educative effect on the child as well as his parents, acting as
an effective deterrent to future delinquency.
However, assuming that some of the more rigid rules of criminal
procedure may properly be eliminated from juvenile court proceed-
ings, how may this be done while still affording basic protection? It
has been asserted that constitutional safeguards ought to be provided
only where necessary to assure fair treatment. T4 Under this ap-
proach, relevant factors are to be established, and the scope of judicial
discretion regarding the necessity of a particular safeguard is to be
delineated, by appellate decisions on a case-by-case basis. In addition
to the obvious dangers that decisions which were intended to be
limited to a particular fact situation may be regarded as binding in
future cases, and that appellate courts have little control in these
matters because so much depends upon the fact situation, there is a
much more serious objection. The process could well be an empirical
one because matters within the competence of the juvenile court are,
by their very nature, certain to evoke conflicting emotions. Every
judge has an ineradicable socio-cultural background in these matters,
which, subconsciously at least, might tend to color a decision left to
his general discretion. In addition, since family matters are com-
monly experienced, and individual expertise is assumed to follow,
there is likely to be a wide variance in the decisions. If so, the fa-
miliar remark concerning undisciplined discretion in equity cases, to
the effect that equity was only as long as the chancellor's foot, is rele-
vant. 65 Equally germane is the more recent opinion of a Massachu-
setts court in denying the discretion of trial judges to consider con-
duct short of recrimination as a bar to divorce:
In respect to divorce, wide cleavages of opinion exist. ... The
divorce law has to be administered by judges whose personal
opinions vary as widely as do those of other people.... If everyjudge .... were entitled to exercise discretion according to his
163. A detrimental aspect pointing up the need for counsel is that an infant
untrained in the law and overawed by the presence of the court might be unable
to conduct an intelligent and effective fight for his freedom without proper advice.
See In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955).
164. People v. Dotsen, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 895, 299 P.2d 875, 877 (1956).
165. Selden, Table Talk 54 (1696): "Equity is according to the conscience of
him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis all
one as if they should make the standard for the Measure, we call a Chancellor's
Foot, what an uncertain measure this would be? One Chancellor has a long Foot,
another a short Foot, a third an indifferent foot; 'tis the same thing in the Chan-
cellor's Conscience."
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own ideas of propriety or of public policy, the judicial branch of
government... would become a govenment of men and not of
laws.' 66
To avoid delegating undefined discretion to the courts, and to
afford more clearly defined rights to the juvenile offender, considera-
tion should be given to specific legislation which would define, regu-
larize, and record, the governing policy for all to know that it exists.
Such legislation would clearly differentiate between the categories of
causes which bring children before the juvenile court. By a separa-
tion rather than a consolidation of these causes, the term "delin-
quency" would be applied exclusively in cases where a serious anti-
social act was alleged. 6 7 In cases of neglect and incorrigibility, the
constitutional safeguards and the probative force of the evidence
should be those required in non-criminal proceedings."i 8 To guard
against the abuse of power, even when exercised with the loftiest of
motives, and to ensure a proper finding of guilt in delinquency cases,
the same constitutional safeguards and rules of procedure and evi-
dence should be afforded the child as are mandatory in the criminal
trials of adults. While the objectives of "individualized justice" are
recognized and approved, one must always bear in mind that the
child's status and rights, as well as the rights of the parents, are in-
volved. Where an alleged violation of law might empower the court
166. Reddington v. Reddington, 317 Mass. 760, 765, 59 N.E.2d 775, 778 (1945);
cf. note 81 supra.
167. The tendency to consolidate was noted in note 2 supra. Contrast a recent
case reasoning that child dependency or neglect arising not out of any conduct
or misconduct of the child, but from parental deficiency in providing the child
with proper care, maintenance and support, is based on parental delinquency.
Hence, the same evidence which establishes parental lack of fitness determines
the child's status of dependency. However, "incorrigibility" may arise from
extrinsic sources, and the evidence establishing such conditions may be wholly
unrelated to the fitness of the parent to perform his legal duties as a parent.
In re Welfare of Three Minors, 314 P.2d 423, 426 (Wash. 1957).
168. In Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1942), the court reminded
the juvenile court that the social considerations underlying the Juvenile Court
Act and the informal procedures permitted under it are not incompatible with
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to one accused of crime. In In re
Poulin, 129 A.2d 672, 673 (N.H. 1957), the court said: "The worthwhile objec-
tives of the juvenile courts can be accomplished without prohibiting the child or
the parent from obtaining the assistance of counsel."
We should keep complete and accurate records of the proceedings in juvenile
court, just as are kept in criminal court and for use on appeal. Moreover, with
the granting of all procedural safeguards, the record could be used for other
desirable purposes, such as inquiring into the unchaste tendencies of complainants
in rape cases, and in imposing sentence under an "habitual offense" statute in
any subsequent criminal proceeding. See Mass. Ann. Laws c. 119, § 60 (1957);
cf. note 34 supra.
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to deprive the child of liberty and the parents of custody, the court
must first determine from competent evidence in a fair hearing
whether or not the child has, in fact, committed an unlawful act. If a
preponderance of the evidence is thought to be more desirable in de-
linquency proceedings than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, then the
authority of the appellate courts in reviewing the evidence should be
substantially broadened.169
What is needed is a framework of formalism designed solely for
the protection of the juvenile, within which there would be limited
flexibility. This flexibility would take the form of modified courtroom
formalities and an absence of those technicalities not essential to
justice which tend to confuse and intimidate the child. In establishing
proceedings which are readily interpreted to a child and his parents,1y 0
it may also be desirable to eliminate criminal law terminology.171 The
petition initiating the delinquency proceeding should be clear and
specific.172 The court should explain the substance of the charge in
simple language suitable to the child's age and understanding. Social
investigation reports, psychological and psychiatric data should be
prohibited as a source of information on which to determine the issue
of delinquency.37 Unless directed by the court, children should not
be permitted in the courtroom, except when the proceedings are in
169. In re Hill, 78 Cal. App. 23, 247 Pac. 591 (1926) (similar to the broader
powers of the chancellor in equity to review findings of fact as well as of law).
See text following note 111 supra.
170. See In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953); In re Green,
123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1952); In re Coyle, 122 Ind. App. 217, 101
N.E.2d 192 (1951); Petition of O'Leary, 325 Mass. 179, 89 N.E.2d 769 (1950);
Kahm v. People, 83 Colo. 300, 264 Pac. 718 (1928); State ex rel. Palagi v. Free-
man, 81 Mont. 132, 262 Pac. 168 (1927).
171. E.g., summons, instead of warrant; petition on behalf of the child, as
opposed to indictment or information; hearing to establish state's right to inter-
vene on behalf of the child, as opposed to trial. Cf. Block & Flynn, Delinquency-
The Juvenile Offender in America Today 340-41 (1956).
172. In re Fisher, 184 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
173. This data would be proper if presented under oath and included first
hand observations on parent-child relationships on issues of dependency and
neglect. Even so, they are highly subjective interpretations of behavior, relevant
only on questions of parental supervision, and should not be relied on without
corroboration. Such reports should be offered for inspection by the child, his
parent, and their counsel, when proceedings begin. In re Godden, 158 Neb. 246,
63 N.W.2d 151 (1954) ; In re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954) ; In re
Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952).
On the extent of use of background reports before hearing, see note 36 supra,
and Note, Correct Use of Background Reports in Juvenile Delinquency Cases, 5
Syracuse L. Rev. 67 (1953).
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relation to the child. 17 ' Even when so related, if the testimony being
given relates to immoral conduct on the part of the child's parents,
the child should be excluded. Where the juvenile is giving testimony
relating to indecent conduct, the judge should have the power to clear
the court of parties not directly concerned in the case.175 If the child
is called as a witness and does not understand the nature of an oath,
then his unsworn testimony may be received if he understands the
duty of speaking the truth.", The judge should ascertain a child's
capacity as a witness by questioning the child and other necessary
persons in the courtroom.177 However, the unsworn testimony of a
child should not be used as the basis for a conviction unless it is
corroborated. In this connection it should be specified that the un-
sworn statement of one child is not corroborated by the unsworn
statement of another. Even if the child is testifying under oath, such
natural drawbacks as an overactive imagination and undue nervous-
ness when in court should be borne in mind and the judge should be
required to instruct the jury of the risks involved in acting on the
uncorroborated evidence of a child, even when given under oath.17
If the child's attendance in court would seriously endanger his health,
there should be a provision for taking his statement out of court. This
might be accomplished by extending the present system of discovery
depositions. However, if such a deposition is used as evidence, the
same statute should provide for giving interested parties an oppor-
tunity to be present at the deposition and to cross-examine the child
who is making it.'" The trial should be open. However, if it is felt
that publicity about the proceedings would harm the child, then the
court in its discretion could restrict the revelation of any particulars
which would lead to the identification of the child, as well as pictures
of the child.180
An alternative solution would be to refer serious juvenile cases to
criminal courts for jury trial, with referral back to the juvenile court
for sentencing after a finding of guilt. The advantages of this type of
handling are: (1) juvenile courts often have superior clinical facili-
ties for the individualized disposition of each case; (2) there is less
174. Mass. Ann. Laws C. 119, § 65 (1957) ("No minor shall be allowed to be
present at any such hearing unless his presence is necessary either as a party
or a witness."); S.C. Code § 15-1155 (1952).
175. Children and Young Persons Act, 23 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 37(1) (1933).
176. Id. at § 38.
177. Rex v. Reynolds [1950] 1 K.B. 606.
178. If any child whose unsworn evidence is received wilfully gives false
evidence, he should be liable to penalties, provided he would have been guilty of
perjury had his evidence been given under oath.
179. Children and Young Persons Act, 23 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 43 (1933).
180. Id. at § 39.
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tendency to use a social background investigation, including reports
on school and general behavior, home and neighborhood surroundings,
before an adjudication of status; (3) it would lessen the reluctance
on the part of the court to dismiss the child when, even though the
child may be adjudicated innocent, the court feels that treatment is
necessary.
Implicit in the right to counsel to be guaranteed in all cases would
be an offer of counsel and an implementation of that offer. 81 The
argument that attorneys in juvenile proceedings are uninformed
pettifoggers is often well-founded. It is recognized that a universal
right to counsel will produce the desired result only after we have
trained specialists in this field. However, pettifogging is a matter for
control of the courts and adequate understanding of the aims and
procedure of the juvenile courts is the responsibility of legal educa-
tion.
Persons drafting such legislation must assume that standards will
be implemented by competent personnel, and public efforts must be
made to educate appointive agencies to the absolute necessity of ap-
pointing as juvenile judges people who are specially fitted for the
position.
The possibilities suggested above certainly merit serious considera-
tion in accommodating the various interests involved and striking a
realistic and rational balance between the clinical and legalistic ob-
jectives of the juvenile court.18 2
181. Assignment of counsel with adequate compensation, possibly through the
Legal Aid Society. See Tappan, Delinquent Girls in Court 192 (1947); Ferguson
v. Pottawattamie County, 224 Iowa 518, 278 N.W. 223 (1938).
182. Glueck, Crime and Justice 49-53 (1936). "But unbridled sentimentalism
is also bad. Deep though our pity be, we cannot indulge in futile sentimentality
while dangerous persons stalk the land. We must discipline our humane impulses
with science and good sense. A head without a heart may lead to tyranny; a
heart without a head may mean annihilation .... These two principles, then, the
ethical and the scientific, must both be reckoned with." Id. at 6.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1958/iss2/1
